Friday 23 November 2012

Avanti (AVN) ... sales and receivables

Following on from my initial comments on Avanti Communications (AVN) (AVN - a space oddity), I reckon the group’s adoption of increasingly conservative accounting required further investigation.

So here’s something of an investigation. Of the several items which struck me as odd in AVN’s recent announcements, one feature was …

“… the Board has adopted an increasingly conservative accounting treatment for certain FY12 transactions, particularly relating to the deferral of income over the lifetime of contracts, regardless of upfront cash inflows.”
I thought this was a peculiar statement to make. However, having read AVN’s recently released 2012 annual report, I reckon it is less the deferred income which warrants attention and more so the group’s trade receivables and particularly its accrued income.

Within the table below, I have reproduced several of the key items from the accounts, which relate to revenue, receivables and payables.
The company reported £12,461,000 of revenue during 2012 (2011: £5,462,000). Of this 36.1% or c. £4,489,000 (2011: 20.6% or c. £1,125,000) was reported to be revenue attributable to the European Space Agency (ESA). AVN has an agreement with ESA whereby in 2006 it entered into a contract with ESA to receive funding for the build of its HYLAS 1 satellite in return for which ESA received the right to use up to 10% of the capacity on HYLAS 1 for a period of three years if the capacity is available. As such, AVN has £20,705,000 of deferred income on its balance sheet relating to the ESA. I.e. it is working off the funding it received and booking the relevant level of revenue as it delivers to ESA. This looks fairly straightforward.
Taking the ESA revenue aside leaves AVN with c. £7,963,000 of non-ESA related revenue in 2012 (2011: c. £4,337,000). The company has £13,475,000 (2011: 7,916,000) in current trade and other receivables. Of this, £10,019,000 (2011: £5,276,000) relates to net trade receivables, accrued income and other receivables. This is over 15 months of sales.  Can anyone explain to me why this is so high? To me it looks like the company is financing its customers. The circumstances over the company’s “acquisition” of Filiago also pointed to that view (AVN - still a space oddity).
I would further add that current assets are supposed to be current! That is, they are expected to be turned into cash within a year. Intuitively it seems odd that 15 months of revenue is expected to be turned into cash within 12 months. Is this normal?
And another thing. The company reported £1,441,000 (2011: 1,170,000) of trade receivables. However, it has provisioned for £268,000 (2011: £53,000) against this. I.e. it has provisioned for 19% of the cash it expects to receive from trade receivables, which is up from 5% in 2011. That seems extraordinarily high.
So the company has 15 months of sales due to be turned into cash within 12 months, and of that cash due, it is increasingly less confident of receiving it. This is altogether a strange classification of trade receivables and again draws attention to the unnerving increase of the company’s prospective net debt profile as recently forecast by its broker (AVN - forecasts going the wrong way).


Avanti Communications revenue, receivables and payables, June yr end
Source: Avanti Communications annual reports
Disclaimer: The information, discussions or topics referred to on this blog should in no way be considered “advice” to buy or sell anything. The information which may be referred to is freely available in the public domain and where required the source of information is referenced to for verification. While every effort has been made to ensure the veracity of any information contained within this blog, the author accepts no responsibility for the accuracy of any information contained within this blog or for the sources of information which may be referred to. Readers are responsible for their own actions and interpretation of the information contained within this blog.

Tuesday 20 November 2012

Avanti (AVN) ... forecasts going wrong way

This morning, the latest broker forecasts for Avanti’s financials appeared in my inbox. For anyone with access to Bloomberg, they are readily available there. For those that do not have access to Bloomberg, I have put them into some charts below; the broker’s identity remains anonymous.

What is remarkable is the degree to which the forecasts from this broker have changed inside of five months. In July last, the broker confidently projected revenue of £56.5m to June 2013, rising to £102m to June 2014, and £138.2m to June 2015. Now it forecasts (no doubt as confidently) revenue of £34.5m to June 2013, rising to £68.2m in June 2014, and £110.5m to June 2015. Further, whereas back in July the broker projected AVN to report EBITDA to June 2013 of £35.9m, the forecast is now for £11.4m.

In the light of the material change to this broker’s projections for AVN’s financials in less than five months, I reckon the latest P&L projections mean less than nothing. However, what I would pay attention to is the net debt forecast. This has risen substantially. In July, the broker was forecasting net debt to finish at £82.7m to June 2013. This morning it projects net debt to now be £58.2m higher at £140.9m to June 2013. Moreover, five months ago it forecast net debt to June 2014 to fall to £31.2m. This morning’s update sees net debt now being £97.0m higher than that at £128.2m.

Given the direction with which the this broker is adjusting its P&L forecasts while raising its net debt projections, it is probably understandable why I remain short.

On another note, specifically “Note 2. Revenue” on page 48 of Avanti’s recent set of accounts, I would appreciate it if anybody could provide some clarity on my understanding of it. As highlighted below, AVN reported £12,461,000 (2011: £5,462,000) of revenue in 2012. Further, my understanding is that revenues from the European Space Agency (ESA - with whom AVN have received funding) represents 36.1% (2011: 20.6%) of this, or c. £4,498,421 (2011: c. £1,125,172). These figures are remarkably close to those in the final paragraph of note 2, where the group highlights that £4,471,000 (2011: £1,081,000) of its turnover was from European countries outside the UK. Does this mean that apart from the ESA, the group had virtually no revenue attributable to outside the UK during 2011-12? That’s what it looks like to me, but I would welcome others views.


"Note 2. Revenue" from Avanti Communications Annual Report and Accounts for the year ended 30 June 2012
Latest broker revenue forecasts compared to those from July 2012
Source: Bloomberg
Latest broker EBITDA forecasts compared to those from July 2012
Source: Bloomberg
Latest broker net debt forecasts compared to those from July 2012
Source: Bloomberg

Disclaimer: The information, discussions or topics referred to on this blog should in no way be considered “advice” to buy or sell anything. The information which may be referred to is freely available in the public domain and where required the source of information is referenced to for verification. While every effort has been made to ensure the veracity of any information contained within this blog, the author accepts no responsibility for the accuracy of any information contained within this blog or for the sources of information which may be referred to. Readers are responsible for their own actions and interpretation of the information contained within this blog.

Friday 16 November 2012

Renishaw (RSW) ... Reni – not so – sure

I have no doubt that Renishaw (mkt cap £1.3bn) is a very good company. But ... in the context of its limited visibility of sales, the anaemic macro backdrop, and what others in the electric component space are saying, its valuation appears bonkers.

Renishaw suggests that its “order book remains at approximately one month’s revenue.” The havoc with which this can impact on forecasts is demonstrated in figure 1, whereby consensus sales forecasts were cut by 17% over a six-month period during 2009. In line with the high operational gearing of the business, the impact of weaker sales on overall 2009 earnings was significant. 2009 earnings fell by 89% YOY.

Bloomberg consensus (figure 2) projects sales to rise by 6.5% in 2013 and a further increase of 7.3% in 2014. I reckon this to be somewhat complacent against the weak macro backdrop. Further, the group’s EBITDA margin is projected to improve to between 32-33% over the next few years. As highlighted above, operational gearing can be high in this business and so any deviation from forecast sales and the impact on profitability could be significant.

The group’s dividend is fairly modest, offering a prospective yield of 2.3%. The shares trade at a multiple of c. 5x book value and a P/E rating of 17.2x 2013 consensus earnings, falling to 16x 2014 consensus earnings. Renishaw is not cheap.

Although Premier Farnell (PFL) and Volex (VLX) both service different customers to each other and to Renishaw, I would imagine that weak underlying demand is relatively pervasive across the electrical component space. As such, I reckon the downgrades to earnings expectations for both PFL and significantly so for VLX over recent months are difficult to ignore. Perhaps more so is the close historic correlation between each company’s share price with Renishaw’s, which has dramatically broken down over recent months.

In light of the above, I can see little reason to justify a significantly higher price for Renishaw, but plenty of scope for a sizeable drop. The risk/reward here appears skewed. I shorted at 1776p/shr. 

The limited forward visibility of sales is demonstrated by the sudden drop in 2009
In the context of the weak macro backdrop, consensus sales forecasts seem complacent
RSW valuation - forward P/E rating and EV/EBITDA multiple
Volex (VLX) earnings momentum - what others in the electric component space are saying is hard to ignore
RSW and VLX share prices - the disconnect is also difficult to ignore
RSW and PFL share prices - another disconnect in the electric component space
Disclaimer: The information, discussions or topics referred to on this blog should in no way be considered “advice” to buy or sell anything. The information which may be referred to is freely available in the public domain and where required the source of information is referenced to for verification. While every effort has been made to ensure the veracity of any information contained within this blog, the author accepts no responsibility for the accuracy of any information contained within this blog or for the sources of information which may be referred to. Readers are responsible for their own actions and interpretation of the information contained within this blog. 

Thursday 8 November 2012

Experian (EXPN) ... H1 (still short)

Experian released its half year figures to 30 September 2012 this morning. Aside from the perfunctory stuff at the front, there are four factors towards the back which I reckon should be the main focus.
  1. Operating cash flow in H1 2013 was $433m, marginally down from $439m in H1 2012 (Mar yr-end). The group highlights that cash flow is seasonally weaker in the first half, but still this doesn’t fully explain why it should be lower than the prior year period. This is highlighted by the cash flow conversion being 73% in H1 2013, compared to 79% in H1 2012.

  2. The group is laying out its stall for $110m of “one-off restructuring costs.” Further, the majority of this is suggested to be in cash. $9m of this impacted the H1 cash flow statement, so it would seem the remaining $101m will impact in H2.

  3. Net capex and spend on intangibles (software, databases etc) continues to climb higher. Expenditure on these items rose to $218m in H1 2013, compared to $198m in H1 2012. This equated to 9.5% of sales, while it equated to 9.2% of sales in H1 2012, and 7.2% of sales in H1 2011.

  4. Despite “benchmark” profit again rising, when stripping out goodwill and intangible items, the group’s balance sheet continues to weaken. Net tangible LIABILITIES totalled $2,463bn in H1 2011, $2,645bn in H1 2012, $2,814bn for FY 2012 (Mar yr-end), and rose to $3,187bn in H1 2013. In the light of the loss of shareholder value attributable to PriceGrabber and LowerMyBills, I would be cautious as to the carried value attached to the goodwill and intangibles the group reports arriving at  its total net asset figure.

    The shares are currently flat on the day. For the above reasons and my prior observations (EXPN - a lot of acquisitions, capex and director selling) I remain short.

EXPN share price
EXPN current P/E and EV/EBITDA
EXPN consensus 2013 earnings momentum and share price

Disclaimer: The information, discussions or topics referred to on this blog should in no way be considered “advice” to buy or sell anything. The information which may be referred to is freely available in the public domain and where required the source of information is referenced to for verification. While every effort has been made to ensure the veracity of any information contained within this blog, the author accepts no responsibility for the accuracy of any information contained within this blog or for the sources of information which may be referred to. Readers are responsible for their own actions and interpretation of the information contained within this blog. 

Tuesday 16 October 2012

CO-OP 5.5555 ... encouraging stuff


Yorkshire Building Society today announced a tender offer at 82% of par plus accrued interest for its 5.649 perpetual bonds, which could be called in March 2019. The 82p/shr offer compares to the mid-market price of 71p/shr prior to the announcement. This provides good evidence that some of the smaller, conservative borrowers are prepared to call or offer on perpetual bonds; in this case seven years in advance of the call date. I reckon it makes the discount to par on the CO-OP 5.5555 perpetual (link) appear even better value, especially when the potential return on equity through ETX Capital could be so high. 


Disclaimer: The information, discussions or topics referred to on this blog should in no way be considered “advice” to buy or sell anything. The information which may be referred to is freely available in the public domain and where required the source of information is referenced to for verification. While every effort has been made to ensure the veracity of any information contained within this blog, the author accepts no responsibility for the accuracy of any information contained within this blog or for the sources of information which may be referred to. Readers are responsible for their own actions and interpretation of the information contained within this blog. 

Friday 12 October 2012

Avanti (AVN) ... still a space oddity

The loan by Avanti to its customer, Filiago, for what appears to have been £9.1m is interesting. As it is no longer a loan and has been exchanged principally for goodwill and intangibles, the cash has seemingly gone. The £9.3m loan cropped up some time in H1 2011 (calendar year), although at that time Filiago was not cited in name as the debtor; Avanti carried it on its balance sheet as a “financial asset to a strategic partner.” The loan was reported to accrue interest at 7%, and in the event that the asset was not fully recoverable over the term of the loan, then Avanti had “collateral over the balance which constitutes 75% of the equity interest in the borrower [Filiago] should there be a default.” I find this odd in itself as if a debtor defaults then I would assume the debtor to be insolvent and hence any equity to be near to worthless, particularly if there are hardly any tangible assets, which in this case there were.
 
When Avanti’s 2012 interims were released in February last, Avanti highlighted in its note 9. “Business Combinations/Intangible assets and goodwill” that it had “completed work which enhanced its security over the shares and the business ... The loan continues to carry the option to convert into a 75% equity interest.” To me this appears as though the debtor hadn’t paid any interest due (or was unlikely to) and so Avanti took control of the assets. At this point, Filiago was still not named as the debtor. Provisional values were attributed to the assets, liabilities and goodwill acquired as follows:

 
There are several things to note about the assets, liabilities and goodwill acquired:
  1. Trade and receivables appear to have been materially marked down from a book value of £606k to £229k.
  2. Where’s the cash? The debtor, Filiago, only had £2k in cash? Where did the other £9,133,000 of the loan go?
  3. A business that has net liabilities of £134k, contributes £330k in revenue, a loss of £81.5k, and seemingly cannot honour its interest payments has goodwill and intangibles (I expect the intangibles are possibly values attached to customer lists) valued at £9,478,000.
Skipping forward to Avanti's prelims update to 30 June 2012, and Filiago is identified as the customer/debtor and some items of the assets, liabilities and goodwill have received fairly material changes to their provisional values:
 
  1. Trade and other payables are £629k greater than initially thought.
  2. The value of the intangibles (which could be customer lists or software or other) is worth £2,419,000 less than originally determined six months prior. Fortunately the bulk of the difference has been bumped onto goodwill, which is £2,152,000 higher.
  3. There is still only £2k of cash!
I sent an email to Avanti’s Investor Relations in early March 2012 asking for some clarity on this loan, specifically asking who it was to, and when it matured. I received no answer. So I asked its house broker, Cenkos. They weren’t much help either.
All this seems a far cry from how Avanti described Filiago at the time it won its £1.3m contract in December 2010. Then it described Filiago as “one of the largest satellite broadband subscriber bases in Europe.” Somehow, I can’t see that.
In summary. Avanti had a financial asset of £9.135m on its balance sheet as at June 2011 and now has what is principally £8.448m of goodwill and intangibles on its balance sheet as at June 2012. Where has all that cash gone?
Disclaimer: The information, discussions or topics referred to on this blog should in no way be considered “advice” to buy or sell anything. The information which may be referred to is freely available in the public domain and where required the source of information is referenced to for verification. While every effort has been made to ensure the veracity of any information contained within this blog, the author accepts no responsibility for the accuracy of any information contained within this blog or for the sources of information which may be referred to. Readers are responsible for their own actions and interpretation of the information contained within this blog.

Speedy Hire (SDY) ... speedily higher?

I have bought a few shares in Speedy Hire, the UK tool hire business, at 29.5p/shr as I reckon it should be worth between 45-55p/shr. I like SDY for the following reasons: 
  1. In 2009 it was saddled with debt. Net debt stood at c. £250m. Three years on and the net debt position has been brought down to £76m and I reckon this will have fallen further when it next reports. EBITDA has risen from £34.4m in 2009, to £60.3m in 2012 (Mar year-end), and is forecast (Bloomberg) to rise to £68m this year. Debt is much less of a concern.

  2. While the outlook is now much more encouraging than in 2009, bizarrely, Speedy Hire is actually cheaper than it was in the trough of 2009. Yes, its market cap is £64m higher than it was in 2009. However, since then, it has raised £100m via equity and generated £75m of free cash flow. That would suggest c. £111m of cash has not been reflected in its valuation, which equates to 70% of its current market cap.

  3. It has a net asset value of 45p/shr. This compares to its current price of 30p/shr. Even if one were to strip out intangibles (always wise), then its net tangible asset value is c. 35p/shr. In event of the company being sold or liquidated, I actually reckon there to be far higher upside than this. But either way, there is good support there on a tangible basis.

  4. It generates cash. £75m in free cash flow since 2009, and better prospects going forward. That’s attractive to everyone, especially private equity.

  5. Private equity has a record of strong interest within this space.  Archie Norman’s Aurigo investment vehicle together with the US hedge fund Och-Ziff, bought HSS hire in 2007 for £310m. Last year, Ashtead (AHT, mkt cap £1.7bn) together with Belgium’s TVH Services were reported to be interested in bidding for Lavendon (LVD, mkt cap £244m).

  6. It’s cheap to peers. Speedy Hire trades on (Bloomberg consensus) an EV/EBITDA multiple of 3.1x forward year EBITDA. This compares to Ashtead on 5.3x, Lavendon on 4.2x and VP (VP, mkt cap £130m) on 4.2x. Even if Speedy were not to re-rate higher, as the debt is paid down the value of this should migrate over to the value of the equity.
The key risks are:
  1. Pricing pressure in the sector, which anecdotal evidence suggests has eased over recent months.

  2. Cyclical risks. However, having been in recession for three quarters, the UK economy may emerge at some point. Who knows?
If truth be told, I bought more than a few.
SDY share price
Disclaimer: The information, discussions or topics referred to on this blog should in no way be considered “advice” to buy or sell anything. The information which may be referred to is freely available in the public domain and where required the source of information is referenced to for verification. While every effort has been made to ensure the veracity of any information contained within this blog, the author accepts no responsibility for the accuracy of any information contained within this blog or for the sources of information which may be referred to. Readers are responsible for their own actions and interpretation of the information contained within this blog.

Thursday 11 October 2012

Avanti (AVN) ... a space oddity

Yesterday I sold short in Avanti at 291p/shr and then again at 280p/shr this morning. Avanti appears to be one of those companies where a lot of hype over technology turns to disappointment. To highlight this I present the chart below. Since mid-2010, when its share price peaked at c. 740p/shr, consensus forecasts have fallen by 55-60% for sales in 2013-15. I suspect that when all the brokers get round to publishing new forecasts, that consensus will again be lower. 

Wednesday's 19% drop in its share price would suggest that the prelims statement was a disappointment. Two items in the statement struck me as particularly odd:

  1. The group suggests that in the light of the company's ambition to move to the Full List "the Board has adopted an increasingly conservative accounting treatment for certain FY12 transactions, particularly relating to deferral of income over the lifetime of contracts, regardless of upfront cash flows." I reckon this is an odd statement. In adopting an “increasingly conservative accounting treatment” I then wonder what “accounting treatment” Avanti is leaving behind.

  2. My second observation concerns its penultimate note to the prelims, note 7. “Business combinations/intangible assets and goodwill.”

    Avanti states that on 1 November 2011 it took effective control of Filiago (careful how you say that) GmbH “by enhancing the security over its loans with Filiago.” This again seems odd. Filiago was announced as a customer of Avanti in December 2010 (see link), when it reported a five year contract with Filiago. At that time, this contract was initially valued at £1.3m. Filiago is a broadband reseller. If it is as it appears, then I am unsure why Avanti had provided loans to Filiago. Was the loan for the purchase of its services? If it is the case that this happened, then there is a phrase for that kind of activity. Further, if this did occur then I would be interested to learn if there are other customers to which Avanti has also provided loans; particularly in southern Europe.

If anyone can provide clarity on the above then I would like to hear it.

Ps. I would ignore the token Director purchases that were announced yesterday. They really are small beer when compared to the whopping director sales of c. 858k shares in 2010 at prices of 475p, 700p, and 735p/shr. 

Pps. I would also ignore the broker forecasts. Cenkos is Avanti’s broker and they have previous with pie in the sky target prices. Most notably for Pursuit Dynamics (PDX) where they reckoned it to be worth 1100p/shr as compared to its current 5p/shr.

Avanti consensus sales forecasts
Avanti director share purchase and sales
Disclaimer: The information, discussions or topics referred to on this blog should in no way be considered “advice” to buy or sell anything. The information which may be referred to is freely available in the public domain and where required the source of information is referenced to for verification. While every effort has been made to ensure the veracity of any information contained within this blog, the author accepts no responsibility for the accuracy of any information contained within this blog or for the sources of information which may be referred to. Readers are responsible for their own actions and interpretation of the information contained within this blog. 

Tuesday 9 October 2012

CO-OP 5.5555 ... it's not what you do, it's the way that you do it

The rationale for my purchase of some of the Co-op’s BB+ rated perpetual bonds was incomplete in so much as there were two attractions to the trade. The first appeal was the price and potential return on the bond, which I have detailed prior (and repeated below). The second appeal was the method through which I bought them, which was through my spreadbet provider, ETX Capital.

While it is widely known that indices and equities can be traded with margin and tax efficiently through a spreadbet, surprisingly few investors are aware that it is also possible to trade bonds (sovereign and corporate) the same way. In the case of bonds, this has the great advantage of mitigating the tax liability on any income streams from the coupons, i.e. the coupon is received in its entirety, gross, rather than receiving net of tax. Further, ceteris paribas, the income returns can be enhanced through purchasing the bond on margin. 

The above is probably easiest made clear through a description of my purchase of the Co-op perpetual. The bonds were/are priced at 77p/shr and pay a coupon of 5.5555p/shr (7.2% yield) until December 2015. So I bought 100,000 of them through ETX Capital at a cost of £77,000. Therefore, I expect to receive £5,555.50p per annum through to December 2015. However, ETX Capital offer 25% margin on this line of stock, so the capital which I had to provide totalled 25% x £77,000 = £19,250. I still receive the £5,555.50p pa, so my return on equity (ROE) = £5,555.50 / £19,250 = 28.9% pa. 

In December 2015, the Co-op can decide whether it wishes to call them at par (100p/shr) or not. If the Co-op calls the bonds then I’ll get 23p/shr (100p less purchase price of 77p), or a capital gain of £23,000 and will have accumulated three lots of 5.5555p/shr in between, an income stream totalling £16,666.50p. That comes to 39.7p/shr, or a £39,666.50p gain, or a 51.5% (gross) return over three years. But, because I have bought through ETX Capital, the tax free return on equity is actually £39,666.50p / £19,250 = 206% (gross) over three years. 

Of course the Co-op may decide not to call in 2015 and in that event the coupon drops from 5.5555p/shr to 3-month LIBOR +205bp. Not calling is generally discouraged, but it would mean a post 2015 coupon of c. 2.69p/shr (at current LIBOR). If the bonds aren’t called and the coupon drops to 2.69p/shr, then I reckon the price of the bond drops to c. 68p. This price would equate to capital loss of £9,000, but having still received the 5.5555p coupon each year, the total gain would equate to £16,666.50p - £9,000 = £7,666.50p over three years. Again, because I have bought through ETX Capital, this is tax free and the return on equity = £7,666.50p / £19,250 = 39.8% (gross) over three years. 

So I reckon that having bought through ETX Capital, the ROE over three years will be somewhere between 39.8% to 206% . That appears pretty attractive to me, and I expect the Co-op will call the bonds, which is why I bought and did so through ETX Capital.

Co-op 5.5555 08/29/49 perpetual bond
Disclaimer: The information, discussions or topics referred to on this blog should in no way be considered “advice” to buy or sell anything. The information which may be referred to is freely available in the public domain and where required the source of information is referenced to for verification. While every effort has been made to ensure the veracity of any information contained within this blog, the author accepts no responsibility for the accuracy of any information contained within this blog or for the sources of information which may be referred to. Readers are responsible for their own actions and interpretation of the information contained within this blog.

Monday 8 October 2012

Capita (CPI) … adding to short

Capita announced last week that it had failed to renew the Criminal Records Bureau (CRB) contract it operated since 2002. This contract was widely reported to be worth £40m pa to Capita, or c. 1.1% next year’s sales. It’s not the end of the world but neither is it helpful and highlights the increasing competitiveness in the sector; a few years ago a renewal would likely have been a shoe-in for Capita. In the event, it appears that India’s Tata Consultancy Services is the winner.

As this had cropped back up on the radar and looking back as to why I began shorting (Capita ... it's very bouncy), I decided to short some more at 764p. The key reason to short remains that I reckon Capita will continue to face headwinds on cash flow. Capita had made a fairly large cash call at the start of the year, both through debt and equity. This was suggested to be used to make acquisitions. The size of the raise (c. £562m total; a £285m 2 year loan in February 2012 and c. £277m in equity in April 2012) pointed towards some urgency on the acquisition front. However, on inspection, spending appears to have been fairly pedestrian. The group appears to have spent £150-165m on acquisitions year to date, which is pretty similar to prior years and considerably less than the cash call.

Capita share price
Disclaimer: The information, discussions or topics referred to on this blog should in no way be considered “advice” to buy or sell anything. The information which may be referred to is freely available in the public domain and where required the source of information is referenced to for verification. While every effort has been made to ensure the veracity of any information contained within this blog, the author accepts no responsibility for the accuracy of any information contained within this blog or for the sources of information which may be referred to. Readers are responsible for their own actions and interpretation of the information contained within this blog.

Wednesday 3 October 2012

BAE (BA/) ... merger gamble

Friday last I bought some Dec calls in BAE Systems (BA/, mkt cap £10.9bn). The strike is at 360p/shr and compares to today’s price at 334p/shr. BAE is in merger talks with EADS (EAD, mkt cap €21.2bn). I have no idea whether the merger will go through or on what terms. As the politicos are involved it is likely to be a tortuous process. However, there is a slim chance that Lockheed (LMT, mkt cap $30.2bn) or A N Other may pounce. In that event, BAE goes to 400p/shr in the blink of an eye. And the calls reap a 40p+ gain. Seeing as the price on the calls came to 3.8p, the risk seemed worth taking. I bought a few. They now trade at 5.3p and rising.

Disclaimer: The information, discussions or topics referred to on this blog should in no way be considered “advice” to buy or sell anything. The information which may be referred to is freely available in the public domain and where required the source of information is referenced to for verification. While every effort has been made to ensure the veracity of any information contained within this blog, the author accepts no responsibility for the accuracy of any information contained within this blog or for the sources of information which may be referred to. Readers are responsible for their own actions and interpretation of the information contained within this blog.

Wednesday 26 September 2012

Experian (EXPN) ... I remain short

I remain short of Experian. For a fuller list of reasons I refer to my previous EXPN post.
One of my reasons to sell was the group’s approach to acquisitions. Experian has spent $4.5bn on acquisitions since 2006, and when accounting for the benefit this has provided to its top line, I reckon its organic revenue growth has been lacklustre. These acquisitions also appear to have been priced relatively expensively, and bloated its balance sheet with a stack of intangibles. Were one to strip out its goodwill and intangibles, then the group has net liabilities of c. $2.8bn compared to a market cap of c. $16.6bn.
This morning Experian reported that the sale of its price comparison businesses, PriceGrabber and LowerMyBills, had fallen through. In May, it had announced that it was going to sell the businesses to Ybrant Digital (YBRA IN, mkt cap £423m) for US$175m, consisting of US$100m cash and a US$75m loan note. The businesses were to be sold as they had “been non-core to Experian for several years.” I would take that to mean that Experian had been trying to sell them for several years.
I have no clue why the deal fell through. One reason may be that Ybrant may have failed to raise sufficient finance to complete the purchase. This may be possible as from a cursory glance at Bloomberg, it appears that Ybrant has failed to generate more than £1m in operating cash in any one year since 2007. So paying $175m may have been a stretch. Another reason may be that having looked more closely at PriceGrabber and LowerMyBills, Ybrant decided to pull out. In the case of the latter, it would suggest that Experian may have a difficult time realising much value out of the businesses, for which it originally paid a combined $815m.

Valuation

While the consensus earnings outlook for Experian continues to deteriorate, its valuation continues to rise. It is now priced at its highest P/E on forward earnings in five years. I find that odd and reckon that investors should take a closer look at the quality of its earnings, to see whether it warrants such a lofty rating. I did, which is why I sold. 
Experian 2013 & 2014 consensus EPS compared to share price
Experian forward year price-to-earnings multiple
Disclaimer: The information, discussions or topics referred to on this blog should in no way be considered “advice” to buy or sell anything. The information which may be referred to is freely available in the public domain and where required the source of information is referenced to for verification. While every effort has been made to ensure the veracity of any information contained within this blog, the author accepts no responsibility for the accuracy of any information contained within this blog or for the sources of information which may be referred to. Readers are responsible for their own actions and interpretation of the information contained within this blog.

Thursday 20 September 2012

CO-OP 08/49 ... good to call?

I bought some of the Co-op’s BB+ rated perpetual bonds. They were/are priced at 76.5p/shr and pay a coupon of 5.5555p/shr (7.3% yield) until December 2015. In December 2015 the Co-op can decide whether it wishes to call them at par (100p/shr). If it does then I’ll get 23.5p/shr (100p less purchase price of 76.5p) and will have accumulated three lots of 5.5555p/shr in between. That comes to 40.2p/shr, or a 52.5% (gross) return over three years.

Of course the Co-op may decide not to call in 2015 and in that event the coupon drops from 5.5555p/shr to 3-month LIBOR +205bp. Not calling is generally discouraged, but it would mean a post 2015 coupon of c. 2.69p/shr (at current LIBOR). If the bonds aren’t called and the coupon drops to 2.69p/shr, then I reckon the price of the bond drops to c. 68p; this price would equate to a 3.9% yield.  In that event the return over three years is 3x5.5555p/shr + 68p/shr – 76.5p/shr = 8.2p/shr, or a 10.7% (gross) return over three years.

All in all, to me this looks like 52.5% upside return to 10.7% upside return over three years. I expect the Co-op will call the bonds, which is why I bought.

CO-OP Bank COOPWH 08/49, price
Disclaimer: The information, discussions or topics referred to on this blog should in no way be considered “advice” to buy or sell anything. The information which may be referred to is freely available in the public domain and where required the source of information is referenced to for verification. While every effort has been made to ensure the veracity of any information contained within this blog, the author accepts no responsibility for the accuracy of any information contained within this blog or for the sources of information which may be referred to. Readers are responsible for their own actions and interpretation of the information contained within this blog.

Wednesday 19 September 2012

Sportingbet (SBT) ... GENTs first?

I have a long position in Sportingbet (SBT, mkt cap £300m). I am long because I reckon it to be a good business, in a growing market, ripe for consolidation. On the third point I note some interesting activity announced this morning by Genting (GENT MK, mkt cap MYR33.5bn), the enormous Malaysian gambling group.
 
Genting appears to have announced it's looking to offload its stake in its Australian Casino business, Echo Entertainment (EGP AU, mkt cap AUD3.4bn) for $160m. This may be important for Sportingbet. Genting has been touted in the press as a potential suitor for Sportingbet, see link. An argument against this has been that in the Australian market, a company is apparently permitted to manage a land based casino or an online casino but not both. This ignores the fact that for the moment Sportingbet only does sports betting in Australia so land vs. online casino gaming obstacle is currently moot. But there is undoubtedly ambition on the part of Sportingbet. On today’s move, maybe Genting is freeing up a bit of pocket money and getting its ducks in a row to ease any problems switching from land to online gaming?
 
I would also add that the $160m really is pocket money to Genting; from what I can tell it's forecast to achieve c. £860m in free cash flow this year. Further, once one breaks ranks for Sportingbet, I reckon others follow.
SBT share price
Disclaimer: The information, discussions or topics referred to on this blog should in no way be considered “advice” to buy or sell anything. The information which may be referred to is freely available in the public domain and where required the source of information is referenced to for verification. While every effort has been made to ensure the veracity of any information contained within this blog, the author accepts no responsibility for the accuracy of any information contained within this blog or for the sources of information which may be referred to. Readers are responsible for their own actions and interpretation of the information contained within this blog.

Monday 17 September 2012

Rio Tinto (RIO) ... trousering some calls

Whereas the ECB just jawbones, the FED gets on with it. So this latest wodge of USD has to find a home. The usual port of call is in commodities. With that in mind, I reckon some December calls in Rio Tinto (RIO LN, mkt cap £63bn) look attractive. A December strike at 4000p/shr can be bought at a cost of just 24p/shr. I note that prior rounds of QE have shoved RIO higher by 95% (QE1), 19% (QE2), and 31% (LTRO). On that basis, getting RIO 30% up by Christmas, to say 4300p/shr does not seem much of a stretch. And if that happens, the return is c. 12x. Those odds seem perfectly acceptable, so I trousered some calls.

RIO share price and prior QE
RIO share price vs. FTSE. A gap

Disclaimer: The information, discussions or topics referred to on this blog should in no way be considered “advice” to buy or sell anything. The information which may be referred to is freely available in the public domain and where required the source of information is referenced to for verification. While every effort has been made to ensure the veracity of any information contained within this blog, the author accepts no responsibility for the accuracy of any information contained within this blog or for the sources of information which may be referred to. Readers are responsible for their own actions and interpretation of the information contained within this blog.

Tuesday 4 September 2012

United Rentals (URI) ... Ashtead suggests a buy

Annoyingly I’ve missed out on Ashtead blitzing it this morning. Having marched all this way it was never likely to miss out on cracking 300p/shr, which it’s done with style. US revenues were up 20% YOY in its Sunbelt business, while EBITDA rose by 36% YOY during Q1. Momentum in the business is clearly strong, leading AHT to already anticipate full year numbers as “materially ahead of its previous expectations.”
 
Although I missed out on AHT, I think it presents an opportunity in United Rentals (URI US, mkt cap $3.0bn). On a USD basis, both companies’ share prices have closely tracked each other during the past four years. But this began to break down shortly after URI bought RSC Holdings for $4.2bn in April last. This possibly reflects investor apprehension over integration of the two companies, or uncertainty over the outlook for US construction, or both. On the latter concern, given that AHT is going gangbusters, I suspect URI is also trading well. AHT’s current share price and empirical regularity would suggest that URI should be closer to $47/shr; 47% higher than Friday’s close at $32/shr. If this disparity reflects just integration concerns, then to me that discount seems overdone. So I splashed out on some URI at the open paying $33.65/shr. I think this could be a quick performer. 
 
United Rentals share price compared to Ashtead, USD adjusted
Disclaimer: The information, discussions or topics referred to on this blog should in no way be considered “advice” to buy or sell anything. The information which may be referred to is freely available in the public domain and where required the source of information is referenced to for verification. While every effort has been made to ensure the veracity of any information contained within this blog, the author accepts no responsibility for the accuracy of any information contained within this blog or for the sources of information which may be referred to. Readers are responsible for their own actions and interpretation of the information contained within this blog. 

Friday 31 August 2012

Randstad (RAND NA) ... put-ting away for a rainy day

Hays (HAS, mkt cap £969m) reported its full year numbers yesterday. As expected, the outlook appears cloudy and so it opened around 70p/shr, or 9% down. I closed my short in Hays and long in Michael Page (MPI, mkt cap £1.0bn) (see link). I may have jumped the gun. Hays could go lower. But then I’d made 11% on my HAS short, lost 3% on my MPI long and I’d been short HAS by a factor of 2 to long MPI on 1.That seemed a good return in just over a week.

What I reckon should go lower on the back of Hays’ outlook statement is Adecco (ADEN VX, mkt cap CHF8.0bn) and Randstad (RAND NA, mkt cap €4.4bn); the world’s 1st and 2nd largest recruitment companies, respectively. So I looked at the prices of puts in RAND.

If fundamentals were fully at play, I can see both ADEN and RAND steadily falling as we get closer to 2013. The market is expecting 12% EPS growth for RAND in 2013, rising to 17% growth in 2014, paying a P/E of 10.5x for those 2013E earnings. That seems optimistic to me and predicated on another dollop of new money. Trying to work out what central bankers will do makes second guessing where this market will be by year’s end pretty tough. If the ECB President Draghi gets his way then the market could get a shove higher. However, if BUBA President Weidmann keeps resisting, then it’s difficult to see what props euro land up against the weak fundamentals.

Either way, looking at the RAND puts, I was amazed. December puts in Randstad seem proper value. With the shares trading today at €25.5, December puts with a €20 strike could be bought for c. 35 €cents. RAND found a floor as low as €9.35 in the big bout of chaos we had in 2008/09. If Draghi fails to deliver, economic data remains weak and chaos reigns again, then that €9-10 level could be revisited before year end. In that event, a €20 strike costing 35 €cents, delivers me €10-11; or c. 30x my money. That seems to be astonishing odds and I can’t understand why they’re so high. Maybe the potential for euro weakness lessens the return? Even so, I still reckon it’s staggering value. So I tucked away some puts for a rainy day.


Randstad share price
Randstad valuation, 2013E P/E and EV/EBITDA
Randstad consensus 2013E earnings momentum
Disclaimer: The information, discussions or topics referred to on this blog should in no way be considered “advice” to buy or sell anything. The information which may be referred to is freely available in the public domain and where required the source of information is referenced to for verification. While every effort has been made to ensure the veracity of any information contained within this blog, the author accepts no responsibility for the accuracy of any information contained within this blog or for the sources of information which may be referred to. Readers are responsible for their own actions and interpretation of the information contained within this blog. 

Tuesday 28 August 2012

Capita (CPI) … it’s very bouncy

I’ve shorted Capita.

I had a look back over the notes I’d made when Capita announced an equity raise in April last. Its share price fell by 18% in the weeks that followed from its pre-announcement price. It’s since bounced back by 18%. It’s very bouncy.
My main concerns then and now are as follows:
  1. April’s cash call came shortly after it arranged a new £285m 2 year loan in February 2012. On my maths, that tallies up to a raise of c. £562m from its banks and shareholders during H1.
  2. Prior to its equity raise, Capita had suggested that it would likely reduce its acquisition spend during 2012, relative to previous years. Indeed it acknowledged this in the accompanying statement to its equity raise. It subsequently concluded that the “current acquisition environment continues to offer a rare opportunity to broaden its business”. That seems to me to be a bit of a “flip-flop” approach.
  3. In its equity raise statement, Capita also suggested that “its clients value Capita partly because of its financial strength.” This would be reflected through keeping its net debt to EBITDA level within its targeted range of 2-2.5x (2011: 2.5x). However, in the light of the company spending £1.3bn on acquisitions since 2005, and £733m since Jan 2010, a more welcome outturn would be to see these acquisitions begin to provide a greater input into the reduction of net debt, as opposed to a cash call. I note that my estimate of its free cash flow shows it has not risen since 2009 (in fact it seemed to have halved in 2011 – see below), while the net debt to EBITDA ratio has risen. To me it appears as though prior acquisitions have not helped with the group’s financial strength. So I don’t see why further acquisitions should do either.
  4. Total annual spend on acquisitions has been increasing while the valuations attached to those acquisitions appear to have remained high and the margins bought appear to be getting lower. On my estimates, acquisition spend has been c. £175m, £181m, £311m, £341m in the years 2008-11, while (again on my estimates) the average EBITA margins of the acquired businesses has fallen from low double digits in 2008, to single digits in 2011. Further, despite lower margins associated with acquisitions and the difficult trading backdrop across the market, valuations paid appear to have remained relatively sticky at c. 9x EBITA.
  5. Its net debt has risen from £258m in 2005, to £1.33bn in 2011. This declined to £1,201m in June 2012; however, excluding April’s cash call, net debt would have risen to £1,477m. Meanwhile, on my estimates, CPI’s free cash flow more or less stalled in 2008-10, at £209m, £239m, £240m, and then halved to £121m in 2011.
  6. The Deferred Annual Bonus Plan criteria appear to have been steadily falling. In 2009 the criteria for 33% to 100% vesting was for the company’s EPS growth to fall in the range of RPI + 6% pa up to RPI +16% pa. In 2010, this was brought down to a range of RPI + 4% pa to RPI + 14% pa. In 2011, this was again brought down to a range of RPI + 4% pa to RPI + 12% pa. Over the past two years the upper boundary for vesting has fallen from RPI + 16% to RPI + 12%. That is against the grain of management’s rhetoric on record pipelines.  
  7. Operating lease commitments rose significantly in 2011. Future minimum rentals payable under non-cancellable operating leases rose from £265m in 2010 to £379m in 2011; by 43%.
So for the reasons above, I have gone short.
Capita share price
Disclaimer: The information, discussions or topics referred to on this blog should in no way be considered “advice” to buy or sell anything. The information which may be referred to is freely available in the public domain and where required the source of information is referenced to for verification. While every effort has been made to ensure the veracity of any information contained within this blog, the author accepts no responsibility for the accuracy of any information contained within this blog or for the sources of information which may be referred to. Readers are responsible for their own actions and interpretation of the information contained within this blog.

Wednesday 22 August 2012

Hays (HAS) vs. Michael Page (MPI) ... a gap has opened

Yesterday I shorted Hays (HAS) and went long Michael Page (MPI) at a ratio of 2:1. As I can’t see a hiring frenzy on the horizon and both stocks don’t appear cheap, I fully expect both to go down. But I reckon that Hays is not as good a business as Page and has more downside as a result. On the other hand, if the monetary authorities provide another dose of money salts to perk up the risky assets, then Page should blitz upwards while Hays may take a jauntier stroll. The charts show this all better in pictures than I can say in words ...

Hays vs Michael Page

Hays share price
 
Michael Page share price
Disclaimer: The information, discussions or topics referred to on this blog should in no way be considered “advice” to buy or sell anything. The information which may be referred to is freely available in the public domain and where required the source of information is referenced to for verification. While every effort has been made to ensure the veracity of any information contained within this blog, the author accepts no responsibility for the accuracy of any information contained within this blog or for the sources of information which may be referred to. Readers are responsible for their own actions and interpretation of the information contained within this blog.