Thursday 31 October 2013

Serco (SRP) ... not much PECS appeal

Thursday 31st October 2013

I sold short in Serco (SRP, mkt cap £2.8bn) at 556p/shr.

A few months back, Serco got into trouble with the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) for “... recording prisonersas having been delivered ready for court when in fact they were not. This was a principal performance measure for the £40.7m per annum Prisoner Escorting and Custodial Services (PECS) contract. The MoJ are now investigating what may have been fraudulent behaviour.

Unsurprisingly, Serco agreed to a repayment of the profit earned since the contract was renewed in 2011. What is surprising is that this was estimated to be c. £2m. This contract was renewed in March 2011, suggesting that the c. £2m in profit had been drawn over 29 months. This suggests that even using what may have been a fraudulent means of delivery, that the group only achieved a c. 2% margin on the contract. 2%!!! Gawd knows what it would've been in the absence of irregular interference.

Friday last, Serco’s CEO, Mr Christopher Hyman, walked.

Now the American’s are starting to get uneasy. Negative press coverage in the US is on the up. Around 15% of Serco’s sales are attributable to the Americas. Its most recent contract win centres on the high profile Obamacare programme and is worth c. $115m per annum.

With:
  1. The MoJ investigation unlikely to conclude until the end of November,
  2. The police on the scene,
  3. Indications of paltry margins with or without irregularities,
  4. The CEO departed,
  5. And now the Americans getting upset over “schmoozing”. 
I reckon you’d have to be bonkers to be buying Serco right now. Hence I sold short.

And another thing ...

Technically it looks like the share price has hit resistance in the recent down channel. 


Serco share price
Source: Bloomberg
Disclaimer: The information, discussions or topics referred to on this blog should in no way be considered “advice” to buy or sell anything. The information which may be referred to is freely available in the public domain and where required the source of information is referenced to for verification. While every effort has been made to ensure the veracity of any information contained within this blog, the author accepts no responsibility for the accuracy of any information contained within this blog or for the sources of information which may be referred to. Readers are responsible for their own actions and interpretation of the information contained within this blog. 

Tuesday 29 October 2013

Globo (GBO) ... the very low down on downloads

Tuesday 29th October 2013

Some readers have taken issue with my use of Aruba Networks as a peer to Globo in my prior post, within the Enterprise Mobility/BYOD market. Good Technology, MobileIron and AirWatch have been proffered as more appropriate comparators. All three are owned by a range of private equity firms. As such, it is difficult to get any financial information on each company’s performance and standing within the Enterprise Mobility market.

However, ...

As you'd expect, each company (including Globo) has a downloadable app. So I thought it instructive to see if it's possible to work out how many times each app has been downloaded and what the users have to say. Cue Google search “How can I tell how many times an app has been downloaded?” I was pointed to this website: xyo.net

xyo.net is a very helpful website. It indicates how many times an app has been downloaded onto an iPhone, iPad, or Android based platform. So I searched for:

Globo’s EM product, GO!Enterprise;
Good Technology’s EM product, Good for Enterprise;
MobileIron’s EM product, MobileIron Mobile@Work;
Airwatch’s EM product, Airwatch MDM Agent. 

Here is the first search for Globo's GO!Enterprise ...

Searching for downloading of GO!Enterprise onto iPhone
Source: xyo.net
According to xyo.net, Globo's GO!Enterprise app has been downloaded c. 1,300 times as an iPhone app. There will be a margin of error, which is possibly up to 10%. 

This is the result for Good Technology's Good for Enterprise app onto iPhone ...

Searching for downloading of Good for Enterprise onto iPhone
Source: xyo.net
Good Technology's app has been downloaded c. 676,000 times onto an iPhone. 

Another noteworthy feature of these results is that while Good Technology's app gets a rather paltry rating of 3.1/10.0, Globo's app doesn't even get a rating.

The charts and table below highlight how many times each app has been downloaded (according to xyo.net) across iPhone, iPad and Android based systems. Globo's GO!Enterprise results are so small in comparison that they are not visible in the charts, so I have included a table. 

Reported number of downloads to iPhone, iPad and Android, 000's
Source: xyo.net
Total reported number of downloads, 000's
Source: xyo.net
Total reported number of downloads, 000's
Source: xyo.net
According to slide 38 of Globo's recent investor presentation, AirWatch has "an implied market value of over $1bn." 

Globo peers
Source: Proactiveinvestors.co.uk - Globo investor presentation
With AirWatch's MDM Agent app being downloaded c. 325,000 times, that would work out to be a valuation based on c. $3,077 per download. Similarly, as it is currently capitalised at £213m (c. $342m), Globo's valuation would work out to be c. $46,849 per download, or 15x greater than that of AirWatch's.

Disclaimer: The information, discussions or topics referred to on this blog should in no way be considered “advice” to buy or sell anything. The information which may be referred to is freely available in the public domain and where required the source of information is referenced to for verification. While every effort has been made to ensure the veracity of any information contained within this blog, the author accepts no responsibility for the accuracy of any information contained within this blog or for the sources of information which may be referred to. Readers are responsible for their own actions and interpretation of the information contained within this blog. 

Monday 28 October 2013

Globo (GBO) ... wake up and smell the houmous

Monday 28th October 2013

Globo is a £252m market cap company, quoted on the UK’s AIM market. The group describes itself here as “an international leader and technology innovator delivering multi-platform Enterprise Mobility Management and Telecom software solutions.” It has won a raft of awards for its financial performance and innovative technology. Its share price reached an all-time high in early October.

I reckon Globo employs extremely aggressive accounting.

I will attempt to highlight why its accounting could be considered aggressive, through comparison to a peer. I will also attempt to highlight other aspects to the accounts which should make any reader’s jaw drop.

What does Globo do? ...   

Globo has two main product offerings; Enterprise Mobility (GO!Enterprise) and Consumer mobility (CitronGO!).

The Enterprise Mobility products allow for employers to manage users, content, security etc with regards to access to its data. For employees it allows access to their corporate email, calendar, tasks, notes, customer relationship management data etc, through their own mobile device; Bring Your Own Device (BYOD).

The Consumer Mobility products provide the ability to access smart phone services on feature phones (the more moderately priced alternative to smart phones but obviously lacking the smart phone capabilities). The target customer is aged between 17-30, has email, has a feature phone but wishes to access social networking sites, such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, which are available on smart phones. I’m 34 years old. I know plenty of people in their twenties. Not one of them has a feature phone. Come to think of it, I don’t know anyone with a feature phone. That aside, the target market also encompasses the developing world, where topography and economic factors impacts the preponderance of feature phones. Developing markets are therefore a principal demand driver for CitronGO!

Strong record of growth ...

Since 2007, Globo has reported remarkable growth. Its last annual report shows continuing 2012 revenues of €46.0m, gross profit of €24.1m, and PBT of €17.2m. It has a gross profit margin of 52%, an EBIDTA margin of 48%, and a PBT margin of 37%.

Globo 2011 & 2012 P&L
Source: 2012 Annual Report

How does this compare? ...

By comparison, the US-listed provider of enterprise mobility solutions, Aruba Networks (ARUN US, mkt cap $2.0bn), had FY 2013 revenues of $600m, with a 71% gross profit margin, a 2% EBITDA margin, and was loss making to the tune of $10m at the PBT level. Coincidentally, each company's revenue growth has been practically the same since 2009 (I have included Globo's discontinued operations in this, i.e. including Globo Technologies - see further below). They're in the same field. Their revenues grow at the same pace. Aruba seems like a good comparator

Here are some charts illustrating how Globo compares to Aruba ...

Globo revenue growth compared to Aruba Networks revenue growth
Source: Globo Annual Reports, Aruba 10-Ks, Bloomberg,
2013 Aruba actual (Jul yr-end), 2013E Globo consensus
Globo gross profit margin compared to Aruba Networks gross profit margin
Source: Globo Annual Reports, Aruba 10-Ks, Bloomberg,
2013 Aruba actual (Jul yr-end)
Globo EBITDA margin compared to Aruba Networks EBITDA margin
Source: Globo Annual Reports, Aruba 10-Ks, Bloomberg,
2013 Aruba actual (Jul yr-end), 2013E Globo consensus
Globo revenue compared to Aruba Networks revenue
Source: Globo Annual Reports, Aruba 10-Ks, Bloomberg,
2013 Aruba actual (Jul yr-end), 2013E Globo consensus
Globo EBITDA compared to Aruba Networks EBITDA
Source: Globo Annual Reports, Aruba 10-Ks, Bloomberg,
2013 Aruba actual (Jul yr-end), 2013E Globo consensus
Globo cumulative revenue compared to Aruba Networks cumulative revenue
Source: Globo Annual Reports, Aruba 10-Ks,
Aruba (Jul yr-end), Globo (Dec yr-end)
Globo cumulative EBITDA compared to Aruba Networks cumulative EBITDA
Source: Globo Annual Reports, Aruba 10-Ks,
Aruba (Jul yr-end), Globo (Dec yr-end)
Globo cumulative operating cash flow compared
to Aruba Networks cumulative operating cash flow
Source: Globo Annual Reports, Aruba 10-Ks,
Aruba (Jul yr-end), Globo (Dec yr-end)
Globo net capex as % of sales compared
to Aruba Networks net capex as % of sales
Source: Globo Annual Reports, Aruba 10-Ks,
Aruba (Jul yr-end), Globo (Dec yr-end)
Globo cumulative net capex compared
to Aruba Networks cumulative net capex
Source: Globo Annual Reports, Aruba 10-Ks,
Aruba (Jul yr-end), Globo (Dec yr-end)
Globo cumulative net borrowings and share issue
compared to Aruba Networks cumulative net borrowings and share issue
Source: Globo Annual Reports, Aruba 10-Ks,
Aruba (Jul yr-end), Globo (Dec yr-end)
Source: Globo Annual Reports, Aruba 10-Ks,
Aruba (Jul yr-end), Globo (Dec yr-end),
Operating and net capex to 2012,
net proceeds includes Aruba actual and Globo consensus 2013,
$ values translated to €'s at 1.38
Globo and Aruba's trade receivables, accrued income,
pre-payments, amounts recoverable on long-term contracts
as % of sales compared
Source: Globo Annual Reports, Aruba 10-Ks,
Aruba (Jul yr-end), Globo (Dec yr-end)

Several observations from the charts above:
  1. Each company’s revenue growth has been practically the same since 2009 (I have included Globo’s discontinued operations in this, i.e. including Globo Technologies).
  2. Aruba’s annual revenues are roughly 6x that of Globo’s.
  3. Aruba achieves a superior gross profit margin to Globo.
  4. While Aruba’s gross profit is superior, its EBITDA margin is paltry compared to Globo’s. In fact it’s never been above 6%, while Globo’s has never been below 38%.
  5. During the period 2009-12, while Globo reported a cumulative €158m in revenue and €70m in EBITDA, Aruba reported €1,379m (c. €1,000m) in revenue and $3m (c. €2m) in EBITDA. Globo is clearly doing something right!
  6. Globo has been investing heavily since 2009, so that as a percentage of sales, net capex has averaged 28% per annum. Aruba has been somewhat more pedestrian, spending an average 2% of sales on capex per annum.
  7. On a total cumulative basis, Globo has spent €41m on net capex during the period 2009-12. This compares to Aruba having spent $33m (c. €24m).
  8. Globo has consistently raised finance through debt and share issuance. Aruba has issued equity but also bought it back.
  9. Globo's trade and other receivables have run at 93% to 115% of sales. Aruba's have never been above 23%. 

Oh by the way, Aruba Networks also expensed $140m (23% of sales) as research and development costs during FY 2013 to its P&L. And regularly expenses c. 20% of revenue per annum as R&D. 

Eyebrow raising accounts ...


In comparison to its peer, Globo seems to capitalise a vast amount of cost, has raised significantly more finance through equity and debt, and has a receivables problem. 

In 2011, Globo appeared to have (and I reckon still has) a trade receivables problem. In 2011, the group had €25m (55% of sales) in trade receivables. Further, other receivables and other current assets, the bulk of which were prepayments and accrued income and amounts recoverable on long term contracts, totalled €18.5m. This meant that Globo had €43.5m (96% of sales) tied up in trade receivables, prepayments, accrued income and amounts due on long term contracts. Why amounts due on long term contracts fall into current assets I’m not sure; especially as other receivables classed as non-current in 2011 were de minimis

Globo assets
Source: Globo 2012 Annual Report
By 2012, all these balance sheet items added up to €33.7m or 58% of total 2012 sales, and 73% of 2012 continuing sales. How did this decline?

On 3 December 2012, Globo divested its Greek operations (announcement here). It sold 51% of its subsidiary, Globo Technologies (GT), to a company called, Zipersi Consulting, owned by GT’s management team for €11.2m. This was deferred consideration. In fact the payment schedule seems particularly favourable, with €9.2m of the consideration not due until December 2014 at the earliest and the final instalment in December 2016. Interest at a rate of 5% per annum.

Globo divestment of Globo Technologies
Source: Globo 2012 Annual Report
According to Globo’s 2012 accounts, as at 31 December 2012, GT had €29.7m in trade receivables (including intra group balances), €1.0m in other receivables, and €10.4m in other current assets; a total of €41.1m. GT’s revenue was reported by Globo to be €12.1m to 30 November 2012; hence the €41.1m in trade receivables, other receivables and other current assets, equated to 341% of this 11 month sales figure (2011: 176% on the same basis). 

Globo's record of Globo Technologies' assets
Source: Globo 2012 Annual Report
However, ...

Globo Technologies’ 2012 accounts can be found here; google does a surprisingly good translation. There are some discrepancies with Globo’s record and GT’s. Whereas Globo has GT’s trade receivables at €29.7m, GT has them at €15.8m as at 31 December 2012. In general, the other asset lines also do not tally, although the discrepancy is not that much. The revenue line differs considerably. Whereas Globo has GT achieving €12.0m in revenues to 30 November 2012, GT reports €35.7m in revenues to 31 December 2012. This discrepancy may be down to the sale back of 2 companies from GT to Globo on 22 November 2012, which is mentioned in note 4.4.1 in GT’s 2012 accounts.

Globo Technologies' statement of assets as at 31 December 2012
Source: Globo Technologies 2012 Annual Report
What is really weird is that in Globo’s accounts, it reports GT’s assets as at 31 December 2012, but reports GT’s liabilities as at 3 December 2012. I have no idea whether this is a typo or by design. If the latter then any clues as to why would be welcomed.

Globo's record of Globo Technologies' liabilities
Source: Globo 2012 Annual Report
Further into Globo’s 2012 accounts, in note 21 (page 93), Globo indicates that its share of GT’s revenue was €810,000, which I reckon is for the period from 3 December 2012 to 31 December 2012. This would imply a revenue run rate of c. €20m for GT, (€810,000 x 12 (months) / 49% (Globo’s share). This is higher than the €12.0m of revenues reported to 30 November but less than the €35.7m of revenues that GT reports to 31 December 2012. I have no idea how this reconciles. Further, whereas Globo has GT reporting a profit before tax of €671,000 on revenues of €12,049,000 to 30 November 2012, according to note 21, its share of profit for the period 3 December 2012 to 31 December 2012 comes to a loss of €297,000 on revenues of €810,000.

By the half year stage to 30 June 2013, GT is reported by Globo, to be achieving H1 revenues of €13.6m and PBT of €1.49m, of which €0.7m is attributable to Globo.

As at 31 December 2012, Globo carried its investment in GT at a value of €10.5m on its balance sheet. It also carried the €9.7m in deferred consideration due as non-current other receivables. At the interim stage to 30 June 2013, the carrying value of this investment appears to have risen to €11.2m, while in light of the remaining €600,000*** in deferred consideration which was due on 15 January 2013 and €500,000 due on 31 December 2013, the other receivables line in non-current assets has fallen to €9.3m.
  
***According to the annual report, in note 15 (pages 85-87), €400,000 of the initial €1,000,000 that was due by 15 January 2013, was received prior to the year end, i.e. before 31 December 2012. Hence this is reflected as a cash inflow, and can be seen in the accounts in the last section of note 15, under the net cash (outflow)/inflow related to GT. However, it would also appear that while €400,000 in cash was received, the €7,061,000 in cash and cash equivalents (I presume all cold hard cash) that was held by GT, went with GT. This resulted in a net cash outflow on disposal of GT, of €6,661,000. This is an altogether odd flow of cash for a disposal. Usually one would imagine that the cash flows from the acquirer to the vendor and not the other way around, albeit with an understanding that it flows back over the years to come.

Net cash outflow upon disposal from Globo to Globo Technologies
Source: Globo 2012 Annual Report
Flow of cash from Globo to Globo Technologies
and anticipated deferred consideration schedule
Source: Globo 2012 Annual Report
What I am struggling to find is a reference within the recent interims, to 30 June 2013, which highlights the receipt of the remaining €600,000 which was due on 15 January 2013. The €400,000 of the €1,000,000 due by 15 January 2013 was received in advance and prior to the 2012 FY end and reported. I cannot find the remaining €600,000 cash inflow referenced in the interim’s statement of cash flows.   


So what's happened? ...

What Globo appears to have done is to have put a load of receivables off-balance sheet, replaced on Globo's balance sheet with deferred consideration and a investment valuation in an associate (Globo Technologies).

Continuing annual sales as stated in Globo 2012 Annual Report
Source: Globo 2012 Annual Report
Total annual sales (including Globo Technologies) and
deferred consideration and investment accredited to Globo Technologies
Source: Globo 2012 Annual Report
In the meantime, Globo continues to raise finance and generate free cash outflows.

Net proceeds from borrowings and share issue
as compared to operating and free cash flow
Source: Globo accounts and Bloomberg 2013E consensus

Further concern ...


Within note 31 of the 2012 accounts, Globo highlights something which should raise further concern.

Source: Globo 2012 Annual Report
It would appear that in raising debt, that the group uses its debtors as security. Selling receivables before the collection date in return for finance is a tried and tested method for manipulating operating cash flow. One interpretation may be that this is precisely what Globo is doing here. Companies sell trade receivables (usually to banks), transferring ownership, and take in the cash up front. The benefit to the cash flow statement is that the raising of finance can be demonstrated as a reduction in debtors and therefore a cash inflow to the operating cash flow section as opposed to a financing inflow.

I note that Globo’s CEO, Mr Costis Papadimitrakopoulos, personally co-guarantees the banks’ credit facilities. This statement is somewhat ambiguous, but I take it to mean that he is a guarantor for the facilities in the event that the receivables do not pay up. The way this is worded sounds more like the CEO is so confident in the quality of the receivables (the security) that he has offered to act as guarantor. Somehow I doubt that this was voluntary. 


Further, I have no idea what securing “major customer contracts in exchange for 60-70% of the contract value” involves, but it doesn’t sound good. 

In summary ...


All of this is more than enough to raise all of my eyebrows and prompt me to get on the phone to Jackie at ETX to short more.



Disclaimer: The information, discussions or topics referred to on this blog should in no way be considered “advice” to buy or sell anything. The information which may be referred to is freely available in the public domain and where required the source of information is referenced to for verification. While every effort has been made to ensure the veracity of any information contained within this blog, the author accepts no responsibility for the accuracy of any information contained within this blog or for the sources of information which may be referred to. Readers are responsible for their own actions and interpretation of the information contained within this blog. 

Sunday 27 October 2013

Tesla (TSLA) ... a roller coaster ride?

Sunday 27th October 2013

I was sent this chart on Friday last by a broker friend of mine. If I was long Tesla (TSLA US, mkt cap $20.6bn), then I'd probably stare at that chart for a minute. Possibly two. No position in either TSLA or CSCO. 

Tesla share price (2011 to current) as compared
to Cisco Systems share price pre and post dot com bubble
Source: Bloomberg  
Disclaimer: The information, discussions or topics referred to on this blog should in no way be considered “advice” to buy or sell anything. The information which may be referred to is freely available in the public domain and where required the source of information is referenced to for verification. While every effort has been made to ensure the veracity of any information contained within this blog, the author accepts no responsibility for the accuracy of any information contained within this blog or for the sources of information which may be referred to. Readers are responsible for their own actions and interpretation of the information contained within this blog. 

Thursday 24 October 2013

Globo (GBO) ... a few piccies

Thursday 24th October 2013

Some select charts on Globo (GBO, mkt cap £264m). 
No comment other than that I am short at 70p/shr.


Source: Globo Annual Reports and recent placing RNS
Source: Globo Annual Reports and recent placing RNS
Source: Globo Annual Reports, recent placing RNS, and market consensus
Source: Globo Annual Reports, recent placing RNS, and market consensus
Source: Globo Annual Reports
Source: Globo Annual Reports
Source: Globo Annual Reports
Source: Globo Annual Reports
Source: Globo Annual Reports
Source: Globo Annual Reports
Source: Globo Annual Reports
Globo share price
Source: Bloomberg
Disclaimer: The information, discussions or topics referred to on this blog should in no way be considered “advice” to buy or sell anything. The information which may be referred to is freely available in the public domain and where required the source of information is referenced to for verification. While every effort has been made to ensure the veracity of any information contained within this blog, the author accepts no responsibility for the accuracy of any information contained within this blog or for the sources of information which may be referred to. Readers are responsible for their own actions and interpretation of the information contained within this blog. 

Monday 21 October 2013

Dialight (DIA) ... a dimmer switch?

Monday 21st October 2013

I sold short in Dialight (DIA LN) at 1,196p/shr on Friday. I reckon even after its recent profit warning that the chances of DIA achieving its FY 2013 consensus forecasts are slim to none. 

At Friday’s close of 1,207p/shr, DIA is capitalised at £386m. This appears a rich valuation for a company which has never generated more than £7m in free cash flow (FCF) in any one year; that is as far back as I can see which was to 2007. In fact it only achieved £2.5m in FCF during FY2012. Further it has a tangible net asset value (TNAV) of less than £46m, which corresponds to 139p/shr, or 12% of Friday’s close.

One argument for such a rich valuation may be that it is perceived to be a growth company. Earnings grew by 34% YOY during 2012, however, Bloomberg consensus has EPS growth slowing to just 8% YOY, for FY 2013. So not much growth this year, although improvement is expected next year, with consensus projecting FY 2014 EPS growth rebounding to 41% YOY. As such, the shares trade on 26.6x this year’s earnings, falling to 18.9x next year’s on a P/E basis.

I reckon this year’s out-turn will be considerably worse than consensus projects. As recently as 12th September, DIA warned that “... the Group’s expectations for overall profitability are likely to be broadly in line with the prior year.”

Bloomberg consensus has 20.2% YOY revenue growth to £138.4m (2012: £115.1m) pencilled for FY 2013. Moreover, consensus projects FY 2013 EBITDA to be £24.1m (2012: £22.5m). This implies a FY 2013 EBITDA margin of 20.8% (2012: 19.5%).

When considering the revenue slowdown and the drop in EBITDA margin during H1 2013, then this leaves an awful lot of work to do to achieve FY consensus. Revenue growth was 12.8% YOY during H1, so that H1 2013 revenue rose to £59.9m (H1 2012: £53.1m). If the above £138.4m in revenue is to be achieved for FY 2013, then this implies that H2 2013 revenue needs to grow by 26.6% YOY, to £78.5m (H2 2012: £62.0m). I.e. revenue growth is required to be more than twice that in H1.

The group’s EBITDA margin slipped to 11.4% during H1 2013, from 20.8% in H2 2012 and 18.1% in H1 2012 (FY 2012: 19.5%). For DIA to meet consensus forecast of £24.1m in EBITDA for FY 2013, then this suggests that the group needs to achieve £17.3m in EBITDA during H2 2013 as compared to £6.8m during H1. This implies the EBITDA margin needs to rise to 22.0% during H2 2013 up from 11.4% during H1 2013; i.e. nearly twice the margin of H1.

I stand to be corrected, but I reckon that all this appears a tall order and even if achieved, would only be sufficient to meet what is supposedly priced in for FY 2013. Further, should revenue grow during H2 at the same pace as that during H1, and the H2 margin be unchanged from that of H1, then FY 2013 revenue would be £129.9m and EBITDA £14.7m. That suggests revenue being 6% below consensus and EBITDA being 39% lower than expectations.

DIA has a growth rating. DIA’s earnings are now not growing all that quickly. Something has to give. I suspect it’s the former.

Dialight: semi-annual revenue and EBITDA
and implied H2 2013E revenue and EBITDA from consensus forecast
Source: DIA interim and annual reports, Bloomberg consensus
Dialight: semi-annual revenue growth (%YOY) and EBITDA margin (%)
and implied H2 2013E revenue growth and EBITDA margin from consensus forecast
Source: DIA interim and annual reports, Bloomberg consensus
DIA share price
Source: Bloomberg
DIA consensus FY 2013E EPS forecast
Source: Bloomberg
DIA consensus FY 2014E EPS forecast - also slip sliding
Source: Bloomberg
DIA forward P/E and EV/EBITDA rating
Source: Bloomberg
Disclaimer: The information, discussions or topics referred to on this blog should in no way be considered “advice” to buy or sell anything. The information which may be referred to is freely available in the public domain and where required the source of information is referenced to for verification. While every effort has been made to ensure the veracity of any information contained within this blog, the author accepts no responsibility for the accuracy of any information contained within this blog or for the sources of information which may be referred to. Readers are responsible for their own actions and interpretation of the information contained within this blog.