Monday 17 August 2015

Zalando (ZAL GY) ... H1 prompts further observations

Monday 17th August 2015

Zalando (ZAL GY), currently capitalized at €7.9 billion, last week reported its half year performance to 30th June 2015. This is a follow-up to a prior post on five observations

Here are some further observations ...

As I understand matters, in late 2014 the group decided to extend its practice of invoice billing. Zalando indicates that this is "... a popular payment method in several countries, e.g., DACH, Benelux and Nordics, driving customer satisfaction and check-out conversion."

The customer takes receipt of their package of clothing, shoes, onesie, etc, accompanied by a bill requesting that they settle payment due within a certain period. According to Zalando it is 14 days to pay in Germany; mail order's buy now - pay later.

Apparently, Zalando has an algorithm for weeding out worthy buy now - pay later invoice billing customer types, which historically has proven to be "... robust, successfully limiting risk."  Then - as already mentioned - in late 2014 it extended the invoice billing offer to capture new customers. Low and behold, this together with a rise in systemic fraud resulted in an increase in bad debt, which largely occurred in Q1 2015.

Trade receivables totaling €18.5 million were seemingly written off.

Zalando write down of trade receivables
Source: Zalando H1 2015 report
This would appear to have knocked c. 2.3 percentage points from the Zalando's adjusted EBIT margin.
Impact of receivables write down on group margin
Source: Zalanda H1 2015 report

Several points may wish to be considered:

1. The chickens are coming home to roost


One has to wonder what Zalando expected as a result of loosening whatever qualifying conditions were required in order to extend invoice billing. You hand over your goods on an IOU, you takes your chances.

2. Quality of sales is vital on wafer thin margins


While in the context of €1,377 million of H1 2015 sales an €18.5 million write down is relatively small, it is still c. 5.6% of the incremental €329.5 million increase in sales as compared to H1 2014 sales of €1,047 million. Further still, as profit margins are thin, it has a significant impact. Ex the receivables write down, EBIT would have been 36% higher in H1 2015.

3. Does the maths stack up?


I may well be wrong here but the numbers provided by Zalando in its presentation are somewhat unclear.

As highlighted in the receivables write-off above. €18.5 million was:

"... recorded as an expense in the second quarter of 2015 in line with IAS 8 as a change in estimates. Those changes in estimates relate predominantly to trade receivables originating from the first quarter of 2015."

The group then goes on to highlight that:

"In the second quarter of 2015, Zalando generated adjusted EBIT of EUR 30.2m (prior year: EUR 35.1m). This decrease of 2.3 percentage points in the adjusted EBIT margin from 6.4% in the second quarter 2014, to 4.1% in the second quarter 2015 is due to the afore-mentioned increase in payment costs offsetting the fundamentally strong operating performance of the business."   

So as I understand matters, €18.5 million was expensed in Q2 2015, and without this adjusted EBIT would have been €18.5 million higher at €48.7 million (€30.2 million + €18.5 million), so the adjusted margin would have been 2.3 percentage points higher at 6.4% as compared to the out-turn of 4.1%.

Q2 2015 sales were reported to be €733 million.

Adjusted EBIT of €30.2 million = an adjusted 4.1% EBIT margin, which tallies up as reported.

However, if adjusted EBIT was higher by €18.5 million (due to the impact of the receivables write down) and this was equivalent to an adjusted EBIT margin of 6.4%, then ...

An adjusted EBIT margin of 6.4% on adjusted EBIT of €48.7 million = implied sales of €761 million.

I.e. sales would have been €28 million higher.

I may indeed have my maths wrong on this or there may be rounding errors involved so any light on this would be welcomed.

4. What does this say for some of the businesses in Rocket's portfolio?


If Zalando is experiencing "unexpected systematic fraud" in those bastions of online shopping rectitude being Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Benelux and the Nordics, then what are the chances of systematic fraud for Rocket's Zalora operating in Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines, etc? Or Rocket's Dafiti operating in Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico? Or Rocket's Lamoda operating in Russia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine?

Rocket's Jumia/Zando business operating in Nigeria, Cameroon, Ghana, Uganda, Ivory Coast etc, is probably a safe bet. This is especially as the majority of its c. €62 million of 2014 sales would likely have been settled by cash on delivery in a market where according to Rocket itself "... approximately 80% of the population does not have a bank account to overcome fears of internet fraud."


And another thing ... 

The company is seemingly awash with cash and yet ...


Zalando reported €974 million in cash and cash equivalents to 30th June 2015. Cash and cash equivalents decreased in the period by €77.4 million, the main driver indicated to be due to investment of funds into term deposits.

Here is the group's condensed statement of cash flows and accompanying text.

Zalando H1 2015 condensed statement of cash flows
Source: Zalando H1 2015 report
Here is the group's fuller cash flow statement from H1 2015

Zalando H1 2015 cash flow statement
Source: Zalando H1 2015 report
And here is the group's discussion on the movement in its current liabilities.

Increase in liabilities
Source: Zalando H1 2015 report
A few items to note.

  1. In the accompanying text to the condensed statement of cash flows, Zalando points to positive cash flow from operating activities which had "... mainly been achieved through longer payment terms with suppliers."
  2. As per the cash flow statement, there was a €78.2 million cash inflow attributable to increased trade payables in H1 2015. As highlighted above, this was seemingly a principal driver of the €23.3 million in total operating cash inflow during the same period. 
  3. The cash flow statement shows that total cash outflow into "investments in term deposits" totaled €110 million in H1 2015.
  4. The group again highlights in its discussion on movements in current liabilities, that trade payables rose "... from deliveries of goods and was achieved through longer payment terms with suppliers."
  5. It also indicates that "Under reverse factoring agreements, selected suppliers transferred their receivables due from Zalando totalling €128.2m to a factor as of June 30, 2015 (prior year: €90.5m)."
I'd highlighted the group's use of reverse factoring agreements in my prior post and these arrangements would appear to be forming an increasing proportion of its trade payables and similar liabilities.

In fact, according to Zalando's accounts, its trade payables and similar liabilities have risen as follows:

  • 2013: €410 million
  • 2014: €492 million
  • H1 2015: €569 million

Meanwhile, the group's use of reverse factoring (included in its reported trade payables and similar liabilities) has risen as follows:

  • 2013: €38 million
  • 2014: €91 million
  • H1 2015: €128 million

Hence, reverse factoring liabilities as a percentage of trade payables and similar liabilities have risen as follows:

  • 2013: 9%
  • 2014: 18%
  • H1 2015: 23%   

One possible interpretation of what is occurring is that Zalando is using a third party financier to settle an increasing proportion of its trade payables. Presumably the third party financier is paying a supplier (or suppliers) to Zalando on the date due and Zalando pays the third party financier at a later date.

If this is the case, then it looks increasingly like this reverse factoring arrangement is akin to a loan, benefiting Zalando.

Assuming this interpretation to be correct, then one could be forgiven for thinking it slightly strange. Especially as Zalando would appear to be awash with cash, so much so that it is having to shove increasing amounts into term deposits.

Of course, the upshot of all this is that Zalando's operating cash and free cash flow is materially boosted, while investing cash flows out.

I am short Zalando.

Disclaimer: The information, discussions or topics referred to on this blog should in no way be considered “advice” to buy or sell anything. The information which may be referred to is freely available in the public domain and where required the source of information is referenced to for verification. While every effort has been made to ensure the veracity of any information contained within this blog, the author accepts no responsibility for the accuracy of any information contained within this blog or for the sources of information which may be referred to. Readers are responsible for their own actions and interpretation of the information contained within this blog. 

Tuesday 11 August 2015

Zalando (ZAL GY) ... five observations

Tuesday 11th August 2015

Zalando (ZAL GY, mkt cap €7.7 billion), arrived on the Frankfurt stock exchange in October 2014. Founded in 2008, Zalando is an online clothing, shoes and accessories company. 

It is seemingly very much alike to UK listed ASOS (ASC LN, mkt cap £2.8 billion). However, whereas it took ASOS sixteen years to arrive at £1 billion in sales, Zalando, marked its €1 billion sales card in under four years, and went on to double this within the next two years through to 2014. 


Zalando - share price
Source: Bloomberg

Zalando was founded by the same team behind Rocket Internet (RKET GY, mkt cap €5.4 billion) and each of these promotions (ZAL & RKET) largely share the same major holders on their registers. Indeed in late 2013, Rocket Internet sold and transferred nearly its entire stake in Zalando, to its then existing shareholders, which included the Global Founders and affiliates of Kinnevik (KINVB SS, mkt cap SEK 76 billion). The Zalando spin-off. 


The Zalando spin-off by Rocket
Source: Rocket Internet prospectus

The brief background over, here are 5 observations which prompted me to open a short:

1. Astounding operational leverage


The phenomenal growth in revenue in such a relatively short period of time aside, on my estimates:

Zalando reported a €59 million EBIT loss in 2011, followed by an €84 million EBIT loss in 2012, then a €114 million EBIT loss in 2013. The group then reported a €62 million EBIT profit in 2014, the year of its IPO. This is an astounding €176 million swing in one year.  

Zalando revenue, € million
Source: Zalando prospectus and accounts
Zalando EBIT, € million
Source: My estimates from Zalando prospectus and accounts

As shown in the above charts, Zalando's revenue rose by €452 million in 2014, to €2,214 million. This €452 million increase in revenue was accompanied by the fore-mentioned €176 million swing in EBIT.

The operating leverage is especially strong when considering that €274 million, or 61% of the increase in sales came from outside DACH (Germany, Austria, Switzerland), where - one presumes - greater distribution and marketing costs would have been incurred.

Zalando segment reporting - 2013-14
Source: Zalando annual report

2. Recent trends in site visits


With the use of Similarweb.com, a web traffic data analytic site, I've monitored the monthly desktop visits to Zalando's country* sites as estimated by Similarweb, during the period September 2014 to July 2015.
* zalando.de, zalando.fr, zalando.nl, zalando.pl, zalando.it, zalando.be, zalando.co.uk, zalando.es, zalando.ch, zalando.se

These estimates by Similarweb appear to show that while total monthly site visits rose in the period September 2014 to a peak in January 2015, they have fallen sharply since.

Zalando total monthly site visits according to www.similarweb.com
The total includes combined visits to the sites: zalando.de, zalando.fr, zalando.nl,
zalando.pl, zalando.it, zalando.be, zalando.co.uk, zalando.es, zalando.ch, zalando.se
Source: www.similarweb.com

A few things to consider:

  1. I cannot qualify the accuracy of Similarweb's estimates.
  2. There may well be some seasonal influence on monthly site visits, notably greater visits in the run up to Christmas and the January sales. 

However, using the same source (Similarweb) here is the trend of monthly desktop site visits to the ASOS sites^.
^ asos.com, asos.de, asos.fr, us.asos.com

Asos total monthly site visits according to www.similarweb.com
The total includes combined visits to the sites: asos.com, asos.de, asos.fr, us.asos.com
Source: www.similarweb.com

As can be seen - presumably under the same methodology - whereas Similarweb's estimates show a sizeable decline in Zalando's monthly site traffic since September 2014, there has been a significant increase in monthly site traffic to ASOS's sites.

Further, the monthly site traffic to ASOS's sites would appear to have risen even though there may be seasonal headwinds.

Zalando and ASOS monthly site visits according to www.similarweb.com
The total includes combined visits to the sites: zalando.de, zalando.fr, zalando.nl,
zalando.pl, zalando.it, zalando.be, zalando.co.uk, zalando.es, zalando.ch, zalando.se
and
asos.com, asos.de, asos.fr, us.asos.com
Source: www.similarweb.com

In fact, Similarweb's estimates suggest that monthly traffic to Zalando's sites has fallen by 16% on July 2015's data as compared to September 2014's count. This compares to a 32% increase in monthly traffic to ASOS's sites on the same basis.

Zalando and ASOS percentage change in site visits according to www.similarweb.com
The total includes combined visits to the sites: zalando.de, zalando.fr, zalando.nl,
zalando.pl, zalando.it, zalando.be, zalando.co.uk, zalando.es, zalando.ch, zalando.se
and
asos.com, asos.de, asos.fr, us.asos.com
Source: www.similarweb.com

Here is Similarweb's data on a country site specific basis.

Zalando and ASOS percentage change in site visits according to www.similarweb.com
Sites: zalando.de, zalando.fr, zalando.nl, 
zalando.pl, zalando.it, zalando.be, zalando.co.uk, zalando.es, zalando.ch, zalando.se
and
asos.com, asos.de, asos.fr, us.asos.com
Source: www.similarweb.com

As a whole, these would not appear to be encouraging trends for Zalando.

3. Reverse factoring


Zalando would appear to use a third party to engage in reverse factoring; whereby this is likely to mean that the third party will have paid Zalando's suppliers in advance of the normal payment terms. While this is not altogether unusual, nonetheless, there was a marked increase in the value of supplier payables transferred to the factor. These rose from €37.6 million in 2013, to €90.5 million in 2014.

Reverse factoring can help the buyer to improve the efficiency of its invoice management. But the generosity on the part of the buyer in assisting its suppliers to collect payments early can also come at a price. It can help the buyer to strengthen its terms of contract, which in some cases can result in a discount in its cost of goods.

Increase in reverse factoring during 2014
Source: Zalando 2014 annual report

4. Increase in related party transactions


In addition to a rise in reverse factoring, Zalando also reported a not insignificant level of goods purchased from related parties.

Goods purchased from related parties totaled €75.7 million during 2014, up from just €1.9 million during 2013. However, it should be noted that it is not clear when the party became related during 2013.

Increase in goods purchased from related parties during 2014
Source: Zalando 2014 annual report

And another thing ...


I've always found insider selling proves a pretty good steer.

The founders and insiders sold c. €434 million worth of stock in March last.

Key shareholders selling
Source: Bloomberg  

This was shortly followed by a further €244 million sale of stock by two holders in July last.

Further initial investor selling
Source: Reuters
I sold short at just shy of €32.

Disclaimer: The information, discussions or topics referred to on this blog should in no way be considered “advice” to buy or sell anything. The information which may be referred to is freely available in the public domain and where required the source of information is referenced to for verification. While every effort has been made to ensure the veracity of any information contained within this blog, the author accepts no responsibility for the accuracy of any information contained within this blog or for the sources of information which may be referred to. Readers are responsible for their own actions and interpretation of the information contained within this blog. 

Optimal Payments (OPAY) ... a gamble in China?

Tuesday 11th August 2015

Pursuant to the latest crackdown (see below) by Chinese authorities on online gambling, I've sold short in OPAY (OPAY LN, mkt cap £1,386 million), the online and mobile payments processor. 

Chinese authorities crack down on online gambling
Source: www.china.org.cn

As I understand matters, OPAY derives c. 47% of its revenue from online gambling (see below).

OPAY presentation on proposed acquisition of Skrill - my red highlight added
Source: OPAY 23rd March 2015

Further, that the RoW - which is principally Asia - accounts for c. 32% of the enlarged group's (post Skrill) revenue.

OPAY presentation on proposed acquisition of Skrill - my red highlight added
Source: OPAY 23rd March 2015

Selling short was not a difficult decision to make.

And another thing ...

As can be seen from page 41 of OPAY's March 2015 presentation (above) on its proposed acquisition of Skrill, OPAY highlights that:

"OPAY regards more than 40 countries and territories as "banned" or "non-serviced" including Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Libya, Uganda and Yemen and will not support any online gambling related payment transactions in those countries." 

This compares to Skrill, which indicates:

"Skrill currently regards more than 60 countries as prohibited, including China, Malaysia, Israel, Iran, North Korea and Turkey and therefore will not support any online gambling related payment transactions in those countries."

It's noteworthy that Skrill specifically mentions China as a country where it "... will not support any online gambling related payment transactions ..."

And yet (as highlighted in OPAY's March prospectus below) OPAY has historically derived a significant proportion of its revenue from a single merchant providing services into China. This merchant accounted for 36.7% of OPAY's revenue in 2014. Further, despite Skrill's declared hesitancy towards dealings in China, that it too derived 7% of its 2013 revenue from the same merchant providing services into China.
      
OPAY prospectus from 23rd March 2015
Source: OPAY
Disclaimer: The information, discussions or topics referred to on this blog should in no way be considered “advice” to buy or sell anything. The information which may be referred to is freely available in the public domain and where required the source of information is referenced to for verification. While every effort has been made to ensure the veracity of any information contained within this blog, the author accepts no responsibility for the accuracy of any information contained within this blog or for the sources of information which may be referred to. Readers are responsible for their own actions and interpretation of the information contained within this blog.