Monday, 23 September 2013

Avanti (AVN) ... bizarre reaction to further downgrades

Tuesday 24th September 2013

Avanti Communications reported its 2013 year end results on Tuesday 10th September. Bizarrely its share price has risen 49% on the back of this. If anything, I reckon the update and ensuing broker forecasts (see below) confirmed its weaker outlook.

Disappointingly, the company provided no update to its backlog, which was last reported on 10th July 2013 within its year end trading update. Two months prior, Avanti indicated the backlog stood at £290m. As at 30th June 2013, the group’s backlog over the next three years was reportedly:

FYE June 2014: £42m

FYE June 2015: £46m

FYE June 2016: £40m

This was re-iterated Tuesday 10th September, however, had the backlog been improved upon, then one would've thought the company pleased to update it. It didn't. I took that to imply that there’s been no further improvement during the two months since June.

The latest broker forecasts indicate further downgrades. I’d noticed the dramatic downgrades in November last (forecasts going wrong way) and the latest downgrades are just as severe. However, what is more concerning is the projected net debt profile and significant increase in forecast net debt for FY 2015.

In July 2012, Avanti’s broker confidently projected revenue of £56.5m to June 2013. This was downgraded by 39% in November 2012 to £34.5m. The final out-turn was 40% below November’s forecast and 64% lower than that in July 2012. 2015 revenue projections have also substantially fallen. Whereas £138.2m of revenue for 2015 was projected in July 2012, this was lowered by 20% to £110.5m in November 2012 and is now forecast to be 33% lower at £74.2m.

EBITDA projections have fared worse. In July 2012, £38.5m of EBITDA was expected for FY 2013. It came in at a negative £8.8m. For FY 2015, Avanti is now forecast to achieve £38.7m in EBITDA, which is 66% below July 2012’s projected £113.6m and 51% lower than November 2012’s predicted £79.4m.

What is most concerning is the evolution of the group’s net debt profile. Whereas in July 2012, Avanti expected to finish with net debt of £82.7m, this was raised to a forecast £140.9m in November 2012. The final result was £167.2m of net debt, or over twice that forecast a year prior. In July 2012, the group was forecast to be net cash positive by FY 2015, with net cash of £44.8m. July 2012’s projection is now thought to be off the mark by £209.3m. FY2015 net debt is forecast at a whopping £164.5m.

I looked to Avanti’s house broker’s latest research note to learn why the net debt level would remain so sticky over the next few years. The group is projected to spend £20.5m on capex and £2.1m on maintenance capex each year in 2014 and 2015. So a total capex related outflow of £45.2m during the next two years. This will be offset by a forecast £17.7m of operating cash flow in 2014 and a further £40.1m in 2015, or a cumulative £57.8m in operating cash over the next two years. Debt service payments are also projected to be at a cumulative £10.0m over 2014-15. Oddly, despite projecting £45.2m of capex related spend during 2014-15 and anticipating £62.4m in depreciation over the same period, Avanti’s house broker envisages its fixed assets on the balance sheet to increase by £100m from £424.8m in 2013 to £524.0m in 2015. These numbers appear difficult to square and if anyone has any suggestions as to how they can be reconciled I would be interested to hear.

With projected net debt remaining a burden, the group has indicated its ambition to seek access to further debt. Avanti declares:

“The Company continues to investigate some significant new business opportunities, and believes that the flexibility to grow offered by a bond financing structure might be more suited to its medium term needs.  Avanti has accordingly retained advisers to consider bond finance options, with a view to enabling it to respond quickly and positively to these opportunities as they arise.”

One interpretation may be, they need more cash and equity financing is not readily available. What is somewhat more apparent is that the company is still not yet capable of financing growth out of operational cash flows. It can barely service its current debt pile from its existing stock and flow of cash; well last year it couldn’t. It is forecast to be able to service debt out of operating cash in 2014 but unable to cover capex spend. Both net interest and capex are only covered by operating cash by 2015 and even then there is only £13.3m of headroom according to its house broker. In light of the poor forecasting record of Avanti’s broker I would be uncomfortable with that prediction.
     
Assuming that access to further debt financing is forthcoming, I would be interested to learn what the new creditors would have security over. It is the current debt providers, which have “a charge over the assets of the company”. Therefore it would appear that any further debt would be unsecured and therefore more costly. The group currently has an available drawdown of $328.2m with US Ex-Im bank and COFACE, at an interest rate of 5.5%. It is these lenders which have security over the assets of the company. Incidentally the company indicates that practically all of this available facility is now drawn down. With a reported £38.6m of cash on the balance sheet, a projected £28.3m of combined capex and debt service cost scheduled for 2014, the group is likely to be keen to get access to further funding sewn up soon.
   
Some investors may be encouraged that the directors have dipped into their pockets over the last few weeks to purchase Avanti stock. While this may appear promising, this is not unusual in promotions where the price has collapsed. I would also point out that Avanti’s CEO, Mr D Williams, was compensated by £749,693 in total remuneration during 2012, and most likely similar in 2013. Since the year end results, he has bought a further 10,000 shares at 180p, or £18,000 worth of stock. This appears a token purchase compared to the c. 858k shares that directors sold in 2010 at prices of 475p, 700p, and 735p/shr.

I reckon that the debt position is insurmountable for this satellite promotion; particularly as further debt appears imminent. Accordingly, I have increased my short position. 

And another thing ...
No mention of Filiago (still a space oddity). Whatever did become of that?

Avanti share price
Source: Bloomberg
Latest house broker revenue forecasts compared to those from July 2012 and November 2012
Source: Bloomberg
Latest house broker EBITDA forecasts compared to those from July 2012 and November 2012
Source: Bloomberg
Latest house broker net debt forecasts compared to those from July 2012 and November 2012
Source: Bloomberg
Historic progression of consensus revenue forecasts
Source: Bloomberg
Historic progression of consensus EBITDA forecasts
Source: Bloomberg
Historic progression of consensus net debt forecasts
Source: Bloomberg
Disclaimer: The information, discussions or topics referred to on this blog should in no way be considered “advice” to buy or sell anything. The information which may be referred to is freely available in the public domain and where required the source of information is referenced to for verification. While every effort has been made to ensure the veracity of any information contained within this blog, the author accepts no responsibility for the accuracy of any information contained within this blog or for the sources of information which may be referred to. Readers are responsible for their own actions and interpretation of the information contained within this blog. 

Wednesday, 31 July 2013

UniCredit SpA (UCG IM) ... A European recovery story?

Wednesday 31st July 2013

I read this morning that Goldman Sachs Asset Management (GSAM) has significantly increased its exposure to European equities (Goldman bets on Eurozone recovery). Their belief is that the European recession is about to end. They may have a point. Having been in the doldrums for over two years, the German, French and Italian manufacturing purchasing managers indices (PMIs) are on the cusp of signalling expansion. As far as economic surveys go, there is no better indicator than the PMIs. The German and French service PMIs are also on the up. Germany, France and Italy is c. 75% of the Euro Area, which is all that counts. Two years in contraction is a long time. 

Improving economies means less insolvencies, which should equate to less impairments for the banking sector. Just look at how that has benefited the UK and Irish banks this past year. The share prices of Lloyds, Barclays, RBS and Bank of Ireland have each more or less doubled over twelve months.

Price to book ratios have improved. According to Bloomberg, Lloyds is now priced at 1.1x book, as compared to less than 0.5x in early 2012. Bank of Ireland, would still appear cheap at 0.5x. I have already bought some Bank of Ireland.

With Europe possibly on the mend, and clear evidence of how an improving economy has impacted the UK and Irish banking sectors, I've taken a speculative position in UniCredit (UCG IM, mkt cap €23.7bn) at €4.10/shr. However, cognisant of the fact that Europe has a history of presenting false dawns and that the representations of all these banks’ capital adequacy may be complete hokum, via ETX I've hedged with €4 September puts at a cost of 17 €cents/shr. My instinct is that UCG will move higher relatively quickly on improving economics; I'm targeting €5.5/shr. With the puts, I reckon I've risked €1 to win €4. I think the odds should be better than that. Bloomberg suggests that UCG trades on 0.38x book value. A 0.5x multiple would roughly sit with my expectation of €5.5/shr. 

Germany, France, Italy - manufacturing Purchasing Managers Indices
Source: Markit, Bloomberg
Germany, France, Italy - service Purchasing Managers Indices
Source: Markit, Bloomberg
LLOY, BARC, RBS, BKIR - 12 month share price performance
Source: Bloomberg
Price to book ratios - UCG, LLOY, BARC, RBS, BKIR
Source: Bloomberg
UniCredit - share price
Source: Bloomberg
Disclaimer: The information, discussions or topics referred to on this blog should in no way be considered “advice” to buy or sell anything. The information which may be referred to is freely available in the public domain and where required the source of information is referenced to for verification. While every effort has been made to ensure the veracity of any information contained within this blog, the author accepts no responsibility for the accuracy of any information contained within this blog or for the sources of information which may be referred to. Readers are responsible for their own actions and interpretation of the information contained within this blog. 

Tuesday, 23 July 2013

Euro Bund ... Heresy to the monetarist Taliban

Tuesday 23rd July 2013

I’ve closed my US long bond short (When QE stops the long bond drops). It probably goes lower, but I reckon Bunds fall more precipitously from these levels. So yesterday I called up Jackie at ETX and shorted the German long bond, i.e. the Euro Bund Future at €144.20. The €144.20 implies that 10 year Bunds yield 1.26% pa. It would appear the lowest it has ever yielded since 1990 is 1.07%. That was in April last and corresponded to a price of €147.20. Therefore, €147.20 is probably about as high as it can go.
  
My reasons for shorting are as follows:

  • I reckon it inconceivable that the monetarist Taliban, otherwise known as the Bundesbank (BUBA), will permit long-term interest rates to reside at c. 1% for 10 years. However, it should be noted that they have allowed rates to be between 1-1.5% since mid-2012. How much longer before the BUBA says enough is enough I do not know, but I doubt it is 10, 8, 5, or even maybe just one more year.

  • The spread between German and US ten year notes is the widest it has been for 30 years. US Treasuries yield 2.85% while German Bunds yield 1.26%. Not that I wish to own either, but if I were a buyer I would much prefer 2.85% to 1.26%. Particularly as there is a risk that Germany may at some stage have to assume peripheral debt.

  • I suppose that the euro could appreciate against the dollar to mitigate the spread in yields, but as US interest rates are rising (and euro rates currently not) the dollar is likely only to get stronger. That makes holding US assets more attractive than low yielding euro's. On the other hand, were euro to strengthen, then one would imagine that precedes rising euro rates, which will kill off sub 2% yields. 

  • The ECB could print money and embark on its own QE, but that would be anathema to BUBA philosophy and likely lead to the breakup of the euro. I would imagine that short-term, Bunds may rally although then plummet as the BUBA gets back to business as usual, post its recent disastrous venture into monetary union. 

  • Finally, in technical terms, it appears weak. The price fell below the 200d ma in late May and has recovered over July. But a further, more severe leg down looks to be on the cards. 

In summary:
I reckon I'm looking at up to €3 loss on selling the Bund as compared to €8 or more gain should long-term rates head back to c. 2% or possibly higher. However, should I find myself down the €3, I would probably be inclined to double up. Do I think the monetarist Taliban will permit long-term rates to indefinitely be this low? Nein! 

RX1 Comdty - Generic Euro Bund
Source: Bloomberg
Yield on Generic Euro Bund
Source: Bloomberg
Yield spread against US Treasuries
Source: Bloomberg
Disclaimer: The information, discussions or topics referred to on this blog should in no way be considered “advice” to buy or sell anything. The information which may be referred to is freely available in the public domain and where required the source of information is referenced to for verification. While every effort has been made to ensure the veracity of any information contained within this blog, the author accepts no responsibility for the accuracy of any information contained within this blog or for the sources of information which may be referred to. Readers are responsible for their own actions and interpretation of the information contained within this blog. 

Monday, 15 July 2013

Premier Farnell (PFL) ... Empirical regularity?

Monday 15th July

I am long Premier Farnell (PFL, mkt cap £813m) from 218p/shr for what I reckon could be a smash n’ grab. That is to say that at the outset I did not plan on holding for a prolonged period, just that I project an appealing pop higher in a short space of time. I expect PFL’s peer, Electrocomponents’ (ECM, mkt cap £1,103m) trading update this Wednesday to be the catalyst. Ex-post, I reserve the right to ride any bounce for longer than I’d planned.

What initially caught my eye was empirical regularity (ER). ER is not an iron law but it’s a hard trend to break. Historically, PFL’s share price (and ECM’s) has strongly correlated with that of the performance of the US Philadelphia Semiconductor Index (SOX Index).  According to Bloomberg, the US SOX is a “modified capitalisation-weighted index, comprised of companies that are involved in the design, distribution, manufacture, and sale of semiconductors.” As PFL and ECM distribute electronic components, it's hardly surprising that over the course of many years, their share prices have correlated well with this index. However, more recently this trend has faltered somewhat. I am predicting that ER resumes. 

On a currency-adjusted basis, PFL has significantly underperformed the SOX during the past 12 months. The last periods of significant under-performance were in 2005 and 2011, when PFL rallied from the 160s to the 210s and from the 180s to the 220s, respectively. Given where the US SOX is currently at, and the empirical regularity with which it has led the component distributors, I reckon PFL should be closer to 300p/shr and not 220p/shr (36% upside). As such there’s probably a decent safety margin on being long PFL.

Further encouragement is forthcoming from the boffins at the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA). The SIA report that semiconductor billings jumped 4.6% higher during May 2013. That was the largest sequential monthly increase in sales for the industry in over 3 years. Three-month-moving average sales were 6.3% higher so it wasn't a flash in the pan. Moreover, the Global manufacturing PMIs have also been on an improving trend over recent months.

Electrocomponents reports its 1Q14 trading update this Wednesday 17th July. Comps are relatively undemanding with 0% organic growth achieved in 1Q14, so there is likely some scope for a positive update and read across to PFL.

On a valuation basis, PFL trades at 12x next year’s earnings (Bloomberg consensus). That doesn’t appear expensive when considering that EPS growth is projected to be well into double digits over the forecast horizon. PFL also yields 5% on the dividend.

And another thing ...
I could always have just bought ECM instead. But it’s the chart of PFL which also appeals to the gambler in me. As far as my amateur charting skills can infer, PFL appears to be on the verge of a bull flag breakout.

Empirical regularity; strengthening markets; operational gearing; appealing valuation; attractive dividend; bull flag breakout opp ... Phwoar!!!  I’ve bought a fair few. 

Premier Farnell (PFL) share price vs. US Philadelphia Semiconductor Index (SOX)
Source: Bloomberg
Global manufacturing surveys
Source: Bloomberg
PFL share price - potential bull flag breakout?
Source: Bloomberg
Disclaimer: The information, discussions or topics referred to on this blog should in no way be considered “advice” to buy or sell anything. The information which may be referred to is freely available in the public domain and where required the source of information is referenced to for verification. While every effort has been made to ensure the veracity of any information contained within this blog, the author accepts no responsibility for the accuracy of any information contained within this blog or for the sources of information which may be referred to. Readers are responsible for their own actions and interpretation of the information contained within this blog.