Monday, 21 October 2013

Dialight (DIA) ... a dimmer switch?

Monday 21st October 2013

I sold short in Dialight (DIA LN) at 1,196p/shr on Friday. I reckon even after its recent profit warning that the chances of DIA achieving its FY 2013 consensus forecasts are slim to none. 

At Friday’s close of 1,207p/shr, DIA is capitalised at £386m. This appears a rich valuation for a company which has never generated more than £7m in free cash flow (FCF) in any one year; that is as far back as I can see which was to 2007. In fact it only achieved £2.5m in FCF during FY2012. Further it has a tangible net asset value (TNAV) of less than £46m, which corresponds to 139p/shr, or 12% of Friday’s close.

One argument for such a rich valuation may be that it is perceived to be a growth company. Earnings grew by 34% YOY during 2012, however, Bloomberg consensus has EPS growth slowing to just 8% YOY, for FY 2013. So not much growth this year, although improvement is expected next year, with consensus projecting FY 2014 EPS growth rebounding to 41% YOY. As such, the shares trade on 26.6x this year’s earnings, falling to 18.9x next year’s on a P/E basis.

I reckon this year’s out-turn will be considerably worse than consensus projects. As recently as 12th September, DIA warned that “... the Group’s expectations for overall profitability are likely to be broadly in line with the prior year.”

Bloomberg consensus has 20.2% YOY revenue growth to £138.4m (2012: £115.1m) pencilled for FY 2013. Moreover, consensus projects FY 2013 EBITDA to be £24.1m (2012: £22.5m). This implies a FY 2013 EBITDA margin of 20.8% (2012: 19.5%).

When considering the revenue slowdown and the drop in EBITDA margin during H1 2013, then this leaves an awful lot of work to do to achieve FY consensus. Revenue growth was 12.8% YOY during H1, so that H1 2013 revenue rose to £59.9m (H1 2012: £53.1m). If the above £138.4m in revenue is to be achieved for FY 2013, then this implies that H2 2013 revenue needs to grow by 26.6% YOY, to £78.5m (H2 2012: £62.0m). I.e. revenue growth is required to be more than twice that in H1.

The group’s EBITDA margin slipped to 11.4% during H1 2013, from 20.8% in H2 2012 and 18.1% in H1 2012 (FY 2012: 19.5%). For DIA to meet consensus forecast of £24.1m in EBITDA for FY 2013, then this suggests that the group needs to achieve £17.3m in EBITDA during H2 2013 as compared to £6.8m during H1. This implies the EBITDA margin needs to rise to 22.0% during H2 2013 up from 11.4% during H1 2013; i.e. nearly twice the margin of H1.

I stand to be corrected, but I reckon that all this appears a tall order and even if achieved, would only be sufficient to meet what is supposedly priced in for FY 2013. Further, should revenue grow during H2 at the same pace as that during H1, and the H2 margin be unchanged from that of H1, then FY 2013 revenue would be £129.9m and EBITDA £14.7m. That suggests revenue being 6% below consensus and EBITDA being 39% lower than expectations.

DIA has a growth rating. DIA’s earnings are now not growing all that quickly. Something has to give. I suspect it’s the former.

Dialight: semi-annual revenue and EBITDA
and implied H2 2013E revenue and EBITDA from consensus forecast
Source: DIA interim and annual reports, Bloomberg consensus
Dialight: semi-annual revenue growth (%YOY) and EBITDA margin (%)
and implied H2 2013E revenue growth and EBITDA margin from consensus forecast
Source: DIA interim and annual reports, Bloomberg consensus
DIA share price
Source: Bloomberg
DIA consensus FY 2013E EPS forecast
Source: Bloomberg
DIA consensus FY 2014E EPS forecast - also slip sliding
Source: Bloomberg
DIA forward P/E and EV/EBITDA rating
Source: Bloomberg
Disclaimer: The information, discussions or topics referred to on this blog should in no way be considered “advice” to buy or sell anything. The information which may be referred to is freely available in the public domain and where required the source of information is referenced to for verification. While every effort has been made to ensure the veracity of any information contained within this blog, the author accepts no responsibility for the accuracy of any information contained within this blog or for the sources of information which may be referred to. Readers are responsible for their own actions and interpretation of the information contained within this blog. 

Thursday, 10 October 2013

Avanti (AVN) ... receivables looking a bit 50/50

Thursday 10th October 2013

I finally managed to get my hands on the prospectus for Avanti’s recent bond financing (issued on 27th September 2013). The group raised $370m through 10% Senior Secured Notes due 2019. The prospectus provides much more information than the group’s year end results RNS, and the figures are likely to resemble the full 2013 annual report, which is expected to be published at the end of this month or early November. The profile of debtors, I find alarming ...

Firstly however, it would appear that my assumption within my previous post, with regard to the group’s consultancy related revenue, was correct. I had assumed that AVN drew £2.0m in consultancy revenue per annum and that this was still ongoing. Indeed on page 12 of the prospectus, the group highlights: “We do include projected revenue from consultancy services provided to government customers at the rate of £2.0 million per year, based on the average revenue generated by these services for the last five fiscal years.”

Where I was wrong was in estimating that AVN received £1.8m in revenue attributable to kit/terminals within the year. I had assumed this because in 2012 it had received £1,780,000 (2011: £576,000) in revenue related to the sale of terminals. In the event it would seem I was too conservative for FY 2013. Within the prospectus in note 2 on page 230, AVN indicates that it was actually “... £2,582,000 (2012: £1,780,000) [which] relates to the sale of terminals.” Therefore it seems more likely that the run rate of bandwidth sales was worse than what I’d estimated in my last posting.

Now for the mind-boggling figures ...

From notes 17 and 23 (b), on pages 239 and 244 of the prospectus, AVN highlights its trade and other receivables balances and the ageing of its debtors. Trade receivables for 2013 were estimated at £6,301,000 (2012: £1,441,000) while it then impaired these by £1,111,000 (2012: £268,000) to arrive at net trade receivables of £5,190,000 (2012: £1,173,000). I.e. 18% (2012: 19%) of its trade receivables were written off. However, what’s also alarming is observing the ageing of those remaining net trade receivables.

Trade receivables that were 60+ days past due were reported to total £1,721,000 during 2013 (2012: £127,000). This represented 33% (2012: 11%) of its net trade receivables. Bearing in mind that this excludes the all ready written off receivables mentioned above, suggests that during 2013, the group had 45% (2012: 27%) of its trade receivables either written off or declared at least 60 days past due! It’s worth noting that in the text of note 23, AVN says that “Generally when the balance becomes more than 60 days past its due date it is considered that the amount will not be fully recoverable.” Ay caramba!!!

What's wrong with this picture? ...

Avanti's percentage of trade receivables either impaired or 60 + days past due
Source: Annual Reports, Bond Prospectus

I have observations on the group’s purchase of the Artemis satellite from the European Space Agency, but will leave that for another posting.

But one more thing ... 
Filiago gets a mention in note 13 on page 236. Now with £7,449,000 of goodwill attached to it and what looks like £1,433,00 in intangibles (£127,000 for brand names and £1,306,000 for customer lists). And yet Filiago achieved £1.5m (2012: £1.1m) in revenue during 2013 and racked up another loss. This time, Filiago lost £0.4m (2012: £0.5m). Can you imagine how much goodwill and intangibles would be booked to the balance sheet were Filiago to have been profitable? I reckon I'd run out of digits on my Panasonic scientific calculator!  


Disclaimer: The information, discussions or topics referred to on this blog should in no way be considered “advice” to buy or sell anything. The information which may be referred to is freely available in the public domain and where required the source of information is referenced to for verification. While every effort has been made to ensure the veracity of any information contained within this blog, the author accepts no responsibility for the accuracy of any information contained within this blog or for the sources of information which may be referred to. Readers are responsible for their own actions and interpretation of the information contained within this blog. 

Thursday, 3 October 2013

Avanti (AVN) ... Eh? 2.5 x run rate required?

Thursday 3rd October 2013

This posting may be worth persevering with as you may come round to my view that Avanti’s sales team only managed to achieve sales of c. £10.6m worth of Bandwidth during the 2013 financial year. This compares to total reported revenue of £20.6m for 2013; the fruits of a valiant effort to sell capacity over four years.

Avanti reported £20.6m of revenue for the financial year to 30 June 2013. This compared to £12.5m of sales achieved during FY 2012. Deconstructing this, I reckon we have the following: 

FY 2013 – Year end results

£20.6m of reported revenue

(£4.5m) revenue from the European Space Agency (ESA) contract relating to the financing of HYLAS 1. This £4.5m can be estimated from note 2. (c) of the year end results, that “If the fair value of the capacity sale was altered by 10%, the impact on the revenue figure would be £450,000.” This also ties up with note 2. within the 2012 annual report, which declared that “... revenues from ESA representing the sale of capacity on HYAS 1 comprise 36.1% (2011: 20.6% of total revenue.” 30.6% x £12.46m (2012 revenue) = £4.5m. It is also worth bearing in mind that this is a non-cash receipt.

(£1.7m) of provision for doubtful debts. In other words, the group reckons 8.2% (2012: 1.8%) of its sales will not materialise. How this increasing bad debt provision sits with "Market adoption is maturing and the Company has an increasingly 'blue chip' customer base" I don't know. 

(£1.8m) of kit/terminals. During 2012, the group reported within note 2. of its 2012 annual report: “Of this, £1,780,000 (2011: £576,000) relates to the sale of terminals”. I have assumed that this figure was the same for 2013, although it will need to be confirmed upon publication of the 2013 annual report.

(£2.0m) consultancy. Broker research on the group used to include a breakdown of this figure attributable to consultancy. Indeed the group still reflects its consultancy activities within its accounts. Well it did in note 1. of its 2012 annual report: “Revenue from space consultancy and other consultancy contracts connected with the exploration of space assets are recognised by reference to the stage of completion of the contract activity at the reporting date.” I presume this is still ongoing?

-------------------------------------------------
£10.6m left over for bandwidth sales generated since selling commenced over 4 years ago. A valiant effort.
-------------------------------------------------

In summary:
£20.6m of reported revenue
(£4.5m) ESA revenue
(£1.7m) Bad debt
(£1.8m) Kit sales
(£2.0m) Consultancy
£10.6m of bandwidth sales

Should bandwidth sales have been £10.6m as by the above deconstruction of revenue, then it becomes possible to attempt a further deconstruction so that I reckon that HYLAS 2 satellite sales contributed just £2.0m to total revenue during its 3 months of operation. That equates to just £666,000 per month.

I reckon we have the following:

There were virtually no bad debts in the first half of the year; provisions for doubtful debts were reported to be £11,000. This suggests that of the £1,679,000 of doubtful debts that were reported for the full year, that £1,668,000 was attributable to bad debts in the second half. Therefore, assuming that the split of the remaining adjustments above was evenly divided between the two halves, suggests that the split of adjustments between the two halves is £4.2m in H1 and £5.8m in H2, to arrive at the total of £10m of adjustments for the full year. This suggests that bandwidth sold in each half year may be estimated as:

H1:

£8.6m of reported revenues in H1

(£4.2m) share of adjustments above

£4.4m of bandwidth sales in H1 (all HYLAS 1 as it was not until “By January, service was fully operational (HYLAS 2) with end user deployments rolling out and all customers invoiced. We will therefore report the first material revenues from HYLAS 2 in the second half of the current financial year”, as was reported in the group’s interims to 31st December 2012.

H2:

£12.0m of total revenue for H2 (FY less H1)

(£5.8m) share of adjustments as above

£6.2m of bandwidth sales during H2. Assuming that sales for HYLAS 1 were flat half on half (but experienced £0.2m of bad debts, as last year), at £4.2m, suggests that £2m of sales were attributable to bandwidth sold on HYLAS 2 during H2 over the 3 months average invoicing period (as reported in the 10th July 2013 trading update: “Some customers started service later in the second half than expected and the average HYLAS 2 customer was invoiced for three months during the financial period”. That would equate to £666,000 of HYLAS 2 sales per month.

All this suggests that the estimated revenue run-rate for HYLAS 1 & 2 comes to just £16.4m per annum. i.e. ((£4.2m of HYLAS 1 sales during H2 / 6 months) + (£2.0m of HYLAS 2 sales during H2 / 3 months)) x 12 months = £16.4m. Including the £10m of adjustments above points towards an estimated run rate of £25.4m for 2014 (the total adjustments will be £1m less as the ESA stop in April 2014). This is a far cry from the £50m of sales which is forecast by Avanti’s broker; although I would add that Avanti’s broker has form on being overly optimistic (Bizarre reaction to further downgrades).

Essentially it means that Avanti’s bandwidth sales run rate has to increase by 2.5 times to achieve the £41m of estimated bandwidth sales during 2014. I reckon the group has a limited chance of achieving that and by limited I mean zero.

I’ve increased my short position.

Disclaimer: The information, discussions or topics referred to on this blog should in no way be considered “advice” to buy or sell anything. The information which may be referred to is freely available in the public domain and where required the source of information is referenced to for verification. While every effort has been made to ensure the veracity of any information contained within this blog, the author accepts no responsibility for the accuracy of any information contained within this blog or for the sources of information which may be referred to. Readers are responsible for their own actions and interpretation of the information contained within this blog.

Monday, 30 September 2013

Italian BTPs ... an economic reasoning to short

Monday 30th September 2013

I closed my Euro Bund short (Heresy to the Monetarist Taliban) a while back and will monitor it for a re-entry. This morning I’ve begun to short Italian BTPs, via the Long Term BTP Future (5 Dec 13) thru ETX. The weekend’s news flow, courtesy of the 'feckless and vain' (US officials assessment) Silvio Berlsuconi and his attempt to bring about a fresh election caught my eye and prompted some data digging. From my analysis below, I reckon that the Italian’s have been incredibly lucky to get their debt service cost back below 5%.
   
The debt-deficit arithmetic (DDA) doesn’t stack up. What DDA does is to quantify the ‘race’ between GDP and public debt, or more precisely, between the economy’s trend rate of growth and the rate at which public debt accumulates. If the real GDP growth rate exceeds the real interest rate, and the government achieves a surplus primary budget (i.e. takes in more revenue than expenditure ex-debt service costs), then the debt to GDP ratio shrinks. When the real interest rate exceeds the economy’s growth rate, the debt piles up, unless a primary budget surplus is enough to offset this.

This is evident in the charts below, which demonstrate how Italy got to its c. 120% public debt to GDP level. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) data highlight that Italy’s real GDP growth rate began to significantly decline from the 1980s, while its public debt to GDP ratio ballooned.

During the period 1950 to 1979, Italy averaged a primary annual budget surplus of 2.0% of GDP pa. This compared with 5.4% average real GDP growth pa and an average 0.9% real interest rate over the same period. However, during the period 1980 to 2011, the average primary budget surplus had fallen from 2.0% of GDP to just 0.6% pa, while average real GDP growth fell from 5.4% pa to 1.5% pa. Meanwhile the average real interest rate rose from 0.9% to 3.7%. It is little wonder that Italy’s public debt to GDP rose from 58% in 1979 to 120% in 2011 and is projected by the IMF to be as high as 131% in 2013-14.

Amongst other variables, Italy’s borrowing rate will respond to two key factors over the next five years; Italy’s GDP growth rate, and its primary budget balance. In terms of the growth rate, the problem is that the IMF forecasts Italian real GDP growth to average 1.1% pa during the next five years and inflation to average 1.4% during the same period.

Growth will likely remain anaemic because Italy is now so uncompetitive as compared to Germany, France and even Spain. Italy’s unit labour costs (ULC) are 26% higher than that of Germany’s, 18% higher than that of France, 17% higher than the UK, and 9% greater than Spain’s. Further, they are a whopping 43% higher than ULCs in the US. Unless Italy’s ULCs improve on a relative basis it would appear unlikely that Italy will achieve a significant pick-up in GDP growth. And as the country can no longer depreciate its currency, the only real way that ULCs can improve is either through productivity gains or lower wages. The former appears unlikely (or at least unlikely to prompt a relative improvement compared to other nations). The latter could lead to a nasty debt-deflation spiral whereby the public debt to GDP becomes even greater. It is unsurprising that the Italian Lira devalued by 600% from the seventies through to the mid nineties prior to Monetary Union. That lever is gone.
  
With the borrowing rate currently at c. 4.8%, real interest rates appear likely to average 3.4% or possibly higher; the latter of which I suspect will be the case. In this instance, Italy will need to achieve a primary budget surplus of 2.3% or greater pa over the next five years, in order for the stock of public debt to stand still. This appears a tall order when considering that Italy has only managed a budget surplus of 2.3% or more in 11 out of the last 70 years. Six of those years were during the all important fiscal rectitude period in the run-up to Euro entry. Further, during those 11 years, GDP growth averaged less than 1.3% pa, which would be about right in comparison to the IMF's projections.  

Now that Italian BTPs have fallen again through the 200d ma, I reckon they go lower to somewhere between €95-100. Which is why I’m building a short position.

IK1 Comdty - Generic Italian Long Bond
Source: Bloomberg
Yield on Generic Italian Long Bond
Source: Bloomberg
Italian Gross Public Debt as a percentage of GDP, and IMF forecast 2012-18
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF)
Italian Primary Budget Balance as a percentage of GDP
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF)
Italian Real GDP Growth, and IMF forecast 2013-18
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF)
Italian Inflation Rate, and IMF forecast 2013-18
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF)
Italian Real GDP growth, Real Interest Rate,
and Government Primary Budget Balance, and IMF forecast 2013-18
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF)
Italian Unit Labour Costs in manufacturing compared to other nations
Estimated cost to employers
Source: Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS)
Italian Unit Labour Costs in manufacturing
competitiveness gap to other nations
Estimated cost to employers
Source: Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS)
Historical cross rate of Italian Lira / Deutsche Mark
Source: Bloomberg
Disclaimer: The information, discussions or topics referred to on this blog should in no way be considered “advice” to buy or sell anything. The information which may be referred to is freely available in the public domain and where required the source of information is referenced to for verification. While every effort has been made to ensure the veracity of any information contained within this blog, the author accepts no responsibility for the accuracy of any information contained within this blog or for the sources of information which may be referred to. Readers are responsible for their own actions and interpretation of the information contained within this blog.